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THE NULL PATENT
SEAN B. SEYMORE*
ABSTRACT
Failure is the basis of much of scientific progress because it plays
a key role in building knowledge. In fact, negative results compose
the bulk of knowledge produced in scientific research. This is not a
bad thing because failures always produce valuable technical
information—whether it be a serendipitous finding, an abundance
of unexpected technical data, or simply knowledge that an initial
hypothesis was totally wrong. Though some have recognized that the
dissemination of negative results has many upsides for science,
transforming scientific norms toward disclosure is no easy task. As
for patent law, the potentially important role that negative results
can play in determining patentability has heretofore been overlooked.
This Article addresses these issues by proposing a new medium of
disclosure called the null patent. Whereas null patents would lack
claims and therefore not confer a right to exclude, they would
strongly resemble other patent documents in substantive technical
content and bibliographic information—thus making them amenable
to technology-based classification, indexing, and open-access
searching. This new medium of disclosure has potentially transfor-
mative implications for both patent law and science. Providing the
Patent Office with ready access to a vast body of technical informa-
tion would lead to a more thorough examination and, as a conse-
quence, improve patent quality. Providing inventors with access to
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this information would allow them to gauge patentability ex ante
with greater certainty. And because the null patent repository would
be freely accessible, it would serve the public good by enriching the
public storehouse of knowledge. Finally, null patents would promote
broader policy goals shared by both science and patent law—namely,
to promote technological progress through the dissemination of
knowledge, to coordinate the future development of technology, and
to spur innovation.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2045
I. UNDERSTANDING EXPERIMENTAL FAILURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2050
A. The Ubiquity of Failure in Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2050
B. The File Drawer Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2051
1. Why It Exists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2051
2. Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2054
a. For Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2054
b. For Patent Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2056
II. HARVESTING SQUANDERED KNOWLEDGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2057
A. Why a Patent-Like Document? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2057
1. Risky Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2057
2. The Well-Established Framework of 
Patent Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2060
3. The Need to Mitigate the PTO’s 
Information Deficit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2063
B. Incentivizing Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2065
1. The Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2065
2. A Straightforward Scheme for 
Knowledge Capture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2066
3. Quid Pro Quo Incentives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2068
4. The Special Case of Federally Funded Research . . . . 2071
5. An Exceptional Tool for Defensive Publication . . . . . . 2073
III. USING THE LIBERATED KNOWLEDGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2075
A. The (Often Overlooked) Role of Failure in 
Patent Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2075
1. Novelty: A Patent-Obtaining Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2076
a. The Basic Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2076
b. Experimental Failure and Indirect 
Enrichment of the Public Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2077
2. Nonobviousness: A (Predominantly) 
Patent-Defeating Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2080
a. The Nonobviousness Standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2081
b. Experimental Failure: Indirect Protection of the
Public Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2082
3. Enablement: A Patent-Obtaining or 
Patent-Defeating Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2088
2044 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:2041
a. Statutory Enablement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2089
b. Failed Experiments and the Public Storehouse of
Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2091
B. Benefits of the Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2092
1. It Will Improve Patent Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2092
2. It Will Promote Broader Policy Goals of 
Science and Patent Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2097
C. Potential Objections and Implementation Concerns . . . 2101
1. Technical Junk and Nuisance Prior Art . . . . . . . . . . . 2101
2. Administrative Burden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2103
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2105
2012] THE NULL PATENT 2045
INTRODUCTION
A fundamental goal of the patent system is to encourage the
dissemination of technical knowledge.1 As soon as a patent docu-
ment publishes,2 there is hope that the public will use the technical
details disclosed therein to improve upon the invention, to design
around it, or to engage in other innovative activities.3 Although the
patentee maintains the right to “exclude others from practicing the
invention until the patent term expires, the technical information
disclosed in the patent document has potential immediate value to
the public, which can use the information for any purpose that does
not infringe upon the claims.”4 This supports the patent system’s
broader mission to promote scientific progress and extend the fron-
tiers of knowledge.5
1. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 533 (1966) (“[O]ne of the purposes of the patent
system is to encourage dissemination of information concerning discoveries and inventions.”);
see also EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE: A
STUDY OF HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 143 (2002) (explaining that an essential purpose of the
patent system under the quid pro quo rationale “is to assure [the] dissemination to the public
of technical information” it would not otherwise get). Recent amendments to the patent
statutes facilitate quick dissemination. For instance, until recently, patent applications were
kept in secret unless and until the patent issued. See Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office, USTPO Will Begin Publishing Patent Applications (Nov. 27, 2000), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2000/00-72.jsp. Now, most patent applications in the United
States—and the rest of the world—filed on or after November 29, 2000, publish eighteen
months after the earliest filing date. See American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L.
No. 106-113, app. I, 113 Stat. 1501A-552, 1501A-561, 1501A-566-67 (codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 122(b)(1)(A) (2006)).
2. Patent documents include issued patents and published patent applications. Note that
once a patent application publishes, the information disclosed therein is considered known
to the public even if it never matures into a patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 102.
3. See MICHAEL A. GOLLIN, DRIVING INNOVATION: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGIES
FOR A DYNAMIC WORLD 15-19 (2008) (explaining that disclosure adds to the pool of accessible
knowledge that other creative individuals can use and improve upon).
4. Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 624
(2010) (citing Kirin-Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd., [2004] UKHL 46, [2005]
R.P.C. 9 ¶ 77 (Hoffmann, L.J.)); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Is There a Right to Have
Something to Say? One View of the Public Domain, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 297, 303 n.23 (2004)
(“A patent application must disclose the nature of the invention in detail, and although the
public cannot practice the art during the period of the patent, it can use the information
disclosed in a variety of other ways.”). 
5. This goal emanates from the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution: “To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
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But another important goal of the patent system is to protect
knowledge already in the public domain.6 Two statutory patent-
ability requirements, novelty and nonobviousness, accomplish this
task.7 Each requires a comparison of the invention that the appli-
cant seeks to patent with the “prior art,” which refers to preexisting
knowledge and technology already available to the public.8 Novelty
ensures that an invention is truly new,9 meaning that a patent will
not issue for an invention that “is identically disclosed ... in the prior
art.”10 In contrast, nonobviousness ensures that an invention is “new
enough,”11 denying patentability for trivial extensions of what is
already in the public domain.12 
Given that novelty and nonobviousness both involve prior art, a
patent examiner reviewing an application needs a complete picture
of extant knowledge in the public domain. When this is not the case,
the patent system cannot fulfill its constitutional and statutory
mandate to extend patent protection to inventions that actually
enrich the public domain.13 In recent times, the U.S. Patent and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 223 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(noting that the constitutional command is the patent system’s “ultimate purpose”); Motion
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917) (observing that “the
primary purpose of our patent laws ... is to promote the progress of science and useful arts”).
6. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (“[T]he stringent
requirements for patent protection seek to assure that ideas in the public domain remain
there for the free use of the public.”); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)
(“Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent
knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available.”).
7. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-03.
8. § 102 (defining the documents and activities that can serve as prior art); Kimberly-
Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citing Graham, 383
U.S. at 6).
9. “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter ... may obtain a patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
10. In re Marshall, 578 F.2d 301, 304 (C.C.P.A. 1978). The U.S. Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.) was a predecessor to the Federal Circuit. The Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982 abolished the C.C.P.A. See Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). Soon after its creation, the Federal Circuit
adopted the C.C.P.A. decisional law as binding precedent. South Corp. v. United States, 690
F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc).
11. 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 3.01 (2011); see also 2 PETER K. YU,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL
AGE 2 (2007) (“[N]onobviousness divides the patentably new from the unpatentably new.”).
12. See infra Part III.A.2.
13. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (mandating that an invention actually add something new to
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Trademark Office (PTO) has come under fire for issuing a large
number of “bad” or low-quality patents that fail to do so.14 Several
commentators contend that one cause is the patent examiner’s
failure to obtain or consider the most relevant prior art.15 This is a
persistent topic in debates over patent reform.16
The importance of extant knowledge in the patentability analysis
makes one wonder how many patents would issue if an examiner
had complete knowledge of the state of the relevant art. Although
omniscience is impossible, it is certainly possible to expand the
quantity of technical knowledge available to the examiner. One way
to do this is to tap into the vast body of negative results that con-
stitute most of the information generated in scientific research.17
Perhaps counterintuitively, this information can play an important
role in determining patentability.18 
At present, there are several obstacles that make it hard to collect
this information and put it into the examiner’s hands. First, for a
variety of reasons, the prevailing norm in science is not to publish
details about failed experiments.19 Second, even if this information
were to make its way into the mainstream technical literature,
examiners are much more likely to gauge patentability in light of
prior patents or published patent applications.20 This makes sense
the public domain); Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 64 (1998) (“Consistent with [the
constitutional mandate], § 102 of the Patent Act serves as a limiting provision, both excluding
ideas that are in the public domain from patent protection and confining the duration of the
monopoly to the statutory term.”).
14. See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR
BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO
ABOUT IT 171 (2004) (defining bad or low-quality patents as those that cover inventions that
lack novelty or nonobviousness). Patent quality is discussed in more detail in Part III.B.1. 
15. Id. at 139 (noting situations in which the examiner’s inability to obtain relevant prior
art led to the issuance of a patent of dubious quality); see also Jay P. Kesan & Andres A.
Gallo, Why “Bad” Patents Survive in the Market and How Should We Change?—The Private
and Social Costs of Patents, 55 EMORY L.J. 61, 63-68 (2006) (exploring additional criticisms);
Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY L.J. 181,
181-82 (2008) (same).
16. See infra Part III.B.1.
17. See infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
18. See infra Part III.A.
19. See infra Part I.B.
20. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United
States Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 101-02 (2002) (presenting empirical findings on
references to prior art); Bhaven N. Sampat, Determinants of Patent Quality: An Empirical
Analysis 3 (Sept. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.immagic.com/
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because examiners are familiar with patent documents and have
easy access to them.21 
Thus, the challenge is to figure out how to both liberate informa-
tion about experimental failure and to package it in a format
amenable to patent searching, as well as for broader dissemination
to society. This Article explains how to do just that. Recognizing
that the legal system lacks a structured mechanism for capturing
and disseminating negative information,22 it proposes the creation
of a new medium of disclosure called the null patent.23 Although it
would lack claims and therefore not confer a right to exclude,24 the
null patent would strongly resemble other patent documents in its
substantive technical content, bibliographic information, and con-
formity to formatting conventions.25 And although they would not be
examined, null patents would be indexed by technology, making
them amenable to open-access searching akin to, and perhaps con-
current with, the PTO’s own patent databases.26
This proposal has potentially transformative implications for both
patent law and science. Providing the examiner with ready access
to a vast body of technical information would lead to a more thor-
ough examination and, as a consequence, improve patent quality.27
Providing inventors with access to this information would allow
them to gauge patentability ex ante with greater certainty.28 And
eLibrary/ARCHIVES/GENERAL/COLUMBIA/C050902S.pdf (finding that examiners are less
likely to find nonpatent prior art).
21. See infra note 113.
22. John T. Cross, Dead Ends and Dirty Secrets: Legal Treatment of Negative Information,
25 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 619, 620-21 (2008). 
23. Here the word “null” has two implications. First, the experimental results disclosed
within the document did not produce the expected outcome. See ALLAN FRANKLIN, NO EASY
ANSWERS: SCIENCE AND THE PURSUIT OF KNOWLEDGE 169 (2005) (defining null results in
experimental research). Second, the document would have no legal effect vis-à-vis a normal
patent. See infra note 24.
24. A patent confers upon its owner the “right to exclude others from making, using,
offering for sale or selling, the invention throughout the United States or importing the
invention into the United States” during the patent term. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006).
25. Issued patents and published patent applications are nearly identical in appearance.
See Seymore, supra note 4, at 623 nn.2 & 4.
26. See, e.g., USTPO PATENT FULL-TEXT DATABASES, http://patft.uspto.gov (last visited
Mar. 28, 2012).
27. See infra Part III.B.1.
28. Negative results can play either a patent-defeating or patent-obtaining role. See infra
Part III.A.
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given that the liberated knowledge would be freely accessible to all,
it would promote the public good29 and further the patent system’s
broader policy objectives: to reduce R&D waste, spur creativity, and
ultimately extend the frontiers of science and technology.30 As for
science, there is hope that by raising the profile of negative results,
this proposal will induce a change in scientific norms toward height-
ened disclosure and broader dissemination of technical knowledge.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I explores the roots of the
norm of nondisclosure of negative results in science and the adverse
consequences for both science and patent law. Part II begins by
discussing why the null patent is the best mechanism not only for
harvesting negative results from the sea of squandered knowledge,
but for ensuring that the captured information is both easily
accessible to the PTO and readily disseminated to the scientific
community and the interested public. This Part then describes how
to incentivize researchers to disclose negative results by offering a
straightforward scheme for knowledge capture and identifying
specific inducements that would motivate individual researchers to
participate. Finally, Part III explores the fruits and broader impact
of the liberated knowledge. It begins by describing the important
and often underappreciated role of negative results in patent law
and how implementing the proposed regime could improve patent
quality and promote broader policy goals of patent law and science.
This Part concludes by responding to possible criticisms and con-
cerns. 
29. See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz, Knowledge as a Global Public Good, in GLOBAL
PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 308 (Inge Kaul, Isabelle
Grunberg & Marc A. Stern eds., 1999) (maintaining that knowledge is a public good and
enables society’s development).
30. See infra Part III.B.2.
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I. UNDERSTANDING EXPERIMENTAL FAILURE
A. The Ubiquity of Failure in Science
An experiment fails when it does not produce the expected out-
come.31 This can happen because of poor experimental design, sloppy
research technique, a flawed hypothesis, or for reasons unknown:
No matter how well understood the theories leading up to the
experiments are or how well-designed those experiments are or
how carefully the experiments are done, the end result often is
nothing like what was expected. The results can be thought of as
failures or as a learning that the plan was based on an unknown
flaw. Experimental science delves into the unknown, so the work
beforehand is a best guess at what might be. Sometimes these
best guesses end up being totally wrong and the series of
experiments yield nothing other than the fact that there is
something unexplained.32
Regardless of the cause, in science it is often the case that experi-
ments do not work as planned.33 
In fact, negative results comprise the bulk of knowledge produced
in scientific research.34 But this is not a bad thing because failure
31. See Jonathan Knight, Null and Void, 422 NATURE 554, 554-55 (2003) (investigating
the fate of negative results). For the purposes of this Article, the terms negative results and
failed experiment are used interchangeably to include experiments that do not work as
planned as well as orphan or abandoned results—experiments that yield positive results but
are deemed unpublishable by the researcher. See Chris Patil & Vivian Siegel, Shining a Light
on Dark Data, 2 DISEASE MODELS & MECHANISMS 521, 521-22 (2009) (identifying the various
types of results that lie “inside the black hole of dark data”).
32. JOHN FETZER, CAREER MANAGEMENT FOR CHEMISTS: A GUIDE TO SUCCESS IN A
CHEMISTRY CAREER 14-15 (2004); see also RICHARD H. MCCUEN, THE ELEMENTS OF ACADEMIC
RESEARCH 275-77 (1996) (explaining why experiments fail).
33. MCCUEN, supra note 32, at 51-53; see also FETZER, supra note 32, at 13 (“One of the
most important lessons that a young scientist must learn is that good and innovative research
is a delicate balance of many failures and few successes.”); id. at 15 (“[G]ood science
inherently is full of failed experiments.”). Failed experiments can lead to accidental
discoveries, thereby converting failure into success. See DOROTHY LEONARD-BARTON,
WELLSPRINGS OF KNOWLEDGE: BUILDING AND SUSTAINING THE SOURCES OF INNOVATION 119-20
(1998) (recounting the story of penicillin); Sean B. Seymore, Serendipity, 88 N.C. L. REV. 185,
196-211 (2009) (exploring the role of accidental discoveries in patent law).
34. Patil & Siegel, supra note 31, at 521; see also sources cited supra note 32.
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plays a key role in knowledge building.35 Scientists can always
extract something from a failed experiment. As one commentator
has explained, “The best failures produce[ ] an abundance of data,
and, at the very least, a failed experiment eliminate[s] whatever
approach to a problem was under consideration and thereby ma[kes]
way for some alternative.”36 This is why “[w]ords like ‘positive,’
‘significant,’ ‘negative’ or ‘null’[—though] common scientific jargon
[—]are obviously misleading, because all results are equally rele-
vant to science, as long as they have been produced by sound logic
and methods.”37 So Thomas Edison was right when he said, “No
experiments are useless.”38
B. The File Drawer Problem
1. Why It Exists
The problem with data generated from failed experiments is that
most of this valuable technical information is never disclosed.39
Indeed, the prevailing norm in science is not to report negative
results. This practice of nondisclosure is often called the “file drawer
35. See LEONARD-BARTON, supra note 33, at 119-20 (presenting stories of “failing forward”
from scientific research, which is defined as “creating forward momentum with the learning
derived from failures”); see also STEFAN H. THOMKE, EXPERIMENTATION MATTERS: UNLOCKING
THE POTENTIAL OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES FOR INNOVATION 23 (2003) (“Innovators learn from
failure.... [K]nowledge of either failure or success itself can be stockpiled, providing a resource
that, if not applicable to one set of experiments, can be used for subsequent inquiries.”).
36. ALAN AXELROD, EDISON ON INNOVATION: 102 LESSONS IN CREATIVITY FOR BUSINESS AND
BEYOND 40-41 (2008); see also FETZER, supra note 32, at 17 (“[U]nexpected results created
challenges and forced new innovative thinking because the accepted theories fail [because
they neither] predict nor explain failed experiments that were planned using their
premises.”).
37. Daniele Fanelli, Do Pressures to Publish Increase Scientists’ Bias? An Empirical
Support from US States Data, PLOS ONE, 1 (Apr. 21, 2010), http://www.plosone.org/article/
info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0010271 (emphasis added).
38. NEIL BALDWIN, EDISON: INVENTING THE CENTURY 50-51 (1995) (quoting Thomas
Edison’s remarks to critical financial supporters, reminding them that they were paying for
not just the successful results but also for the experiments themselves). 
39. Cf. David Alcantara, Joe Blois & Carlos Juan Ceacero, Editorial, 1 ALL RESULTS J.
BIOLOGY 1, 1 (2010), http://www.arjournals.com/ojs/index.php?journal=Biol&page=index
(follow “Archives” hyperlink to “Vol. 1, No. 1 (2010)”) (describing the “huge untapped resource
of experimental data locked up in laboratory notebooks that could be of great service to the
scientific community”).
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problem”40 because it is imagined that scientists bury negative
results deep in their file drawers never to see the light of day.41 
The file drawer problem has several causes. First, the bias
against disclosing negative results has a psychological component.
As one commentator explains, “Like all human beings, scientists are
confirmation-biased (i.e. tend to select information that supports
their hypotheses about the world), and they are far from indifferent
to the outcome of their own research: positive results make them
happy and negative ones make them disappointed.”42 
Second, a researcher often has little incentive to disclose negative
results. Since 1665, the peer-reviewed scientific journal43 has been
the principal medium “through which scientists have chosen to both
communicate to their peers” and to archive their “research findings,
... observations, interpretations, and conclusions.”44 But it would be
inaccurate to view manuscripts submitted for peer review as
“historical records of the scientific process.”45 Rather, they are ahis-
torical texts written to maximize their chances of publication in a
prestigious journal.46 And it is no secret that 
the success of a scientific paper partly depends on its outcome.
In many fields of research, papers are more likely to be pub-
40. Robert Rosenthal, The “File Drawer Problem” and Tolerance for Null Results, 86
PSYCHOL. BULL. 638, 638 (1979) (coining the term). 
41. Donald Kennedy, The Old File-Drawer Problem, 305 SCIENCE 451, 451 (2004); see also
1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RESEARCH DESIGN 490 (Neil J. Salkind ed., 2010) (“The file drawer
problem ... arose from the image that ... nonsignificant results are placed in researchers’ file
drawers, never to be seen by others.”); Fanelli, supra note 37, at 1 (attributing the term to the
notion that unpublished “negative papers are imagined to lie in scientists’ drawers”). 
42. Fanelli, supra note 37, at 1 (citations omitted).
43. Peer review refers to the screening of research results by colleagues in a particular
discipline. Peter Hernon & Candy Schwartz, Peer Review Revisited, 28 LIBR. & INFO. SCI. RES.
1, 1 (2006). The mechanics of peer review typically work as follows: First, the researcher
submits the work to a journal. Second, the editor sends it to one or more reviewers
knowledgeable about the problem to judge its merit—uniqueness, methodology, adequacy of
research design, and potential contribution to the field. Third, the editor makes a final
publication decision. Id.
44. RICHARD D. WALKER, PATENTS AS SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL LITERATURE 1 (1995); see
also DARYL E. CHUBIN & EDWARD J. HACKETT, PEERLESS SCIENCE: PEER REVIEW AND U.S.
SCIENCE POLICY 85 (1990) (explaining that publishing in journals replaced haphazard modes
of circulating science and “facilitate[s] communication, allocation of credit, and authentication
of research results”).
45. Patil & Siegel, supra note 31, at 522. 
46. Id.
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lished, to be cited by colleagues, and to be accepted by high-
profile journals if they report results that are “positive” ... all
results that support the experimental hypothesis.47
Disclosing negative results runs the risk of tainting the research
project as inferior—despite the novelty and integrity of the work—or
not conforming to the reviewers’ expectations.48 Either form of pub-
lication bias could mean the “kiss of death” for the manuscript49 or
its delayed publication and relegation to an obscure journal.50 
Third and relatedly, publishing negative results in the peer-
reviewed literature can have negative career consequences. One
commentator explains how:
Since papers reporting positive results attract more interest and
are cited more often, journal editors and peer reviewers might
tend to [favor] them, which will further increase the desirability
of [publishing] a positive outcome to researchers, particularly if
their careers are evaluated by counting the number of papers
listed in their CVs and the impact factor of the journals they are
published in.51
In addition, a recent study reveals that publishing results that do
not positively align with then-existing mainstream ideas can have
a devastating effect on the researchers’ reputation and future in-
come.52 Given these risks, it is easy to understand why a scientist
47. Fanelli, supra note 37, at 1.
48. David Alcantara & Rafael Prado Gotor, Editorial, 1 ALL RESULTS J. CHEMISTRY 1, 1-2
(2010), http://www.arjournals.com/ojs/index.php?journal=Chem&page=index (follow
“Archives” hyperlink to “Vol. 1, No. 1 (2010)”) (exploring “submission bias” which leads
researchers to publish only positive results because they “want their competitors to think they
succeed at every project designed”); Stan Szpakowicz, Failure Is an Orphan (Let’s Adopt), 36
COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS 157, 157-58 (2010).
49. Szpakowicz, supra note 48, at 157-58.
50. Alcantara & Gotor, supra note 48, at 1 (“[P]ositive results have a better chance of
being published, are published earlier, and are published in journals with higher impact
factors.”); Richard Smith, Peer Review: A Flawed Process at the Heart of Science and Journals,
99 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 178, 180 (2006) (describing the bias against work that discloses
negative results).
51. Fanelli, supra note 37, at 1.
52. See Arthur M. Diamond, Jr., The Career Consequences of a Mistaken Research Project:
The Case of Polywater, 68 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 387, 407 (2009) (concluding that researchers
who wrote about polywater, either pro or con, suffered a negative impact on their future
citations and a concomitant loss of financial income). 
2054 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:2041
might conclude that peer review is not the best venue for disclosing
negative results.
But hurdles that tip the scales toward nondisclosure still exist
outside of the peer review context. Logistical issues related to
formatting, collection, and storage of negative results must be
resolved.53 In addition, a researcher might be less inclined to invest
time and energy in writing up failed experiments out of a sense that
the scientific community tends to be more interested in positive
findings than negative ones.54 Finally, some researchers simply do
not want their competitors to know the seemingly fruitless paths
that they have been exploring.55 
2. Consequences
a. For Science 
There is little doubt that any upside that comes from nondis-
closure is far outweighed by the potential downside to the public
storehouse of technical knowledge.56 The most apparent problem is
that there is a cost to science, in terms of time and money, when
other researchers waste resources on experiments that have failed
previously.57 A good example is when a scientist publishes an incom-
plete story of a research project in which the scientifically obvious—
but undisclosed—path failed and a not-so-obvious path worked:
“[O]ther scientists may look at the work and think, ‘Why did they
not do this? It’s obvious’ and then proceed to redo the failures. Thus,
by not reporting on the ‘obvious’ course that failed, one scientist sets
53. Thomas Goetz, Freeing the Dark Data of Failed Science Experiments, WIRED MAGAZINE
(Sept. 25, 2007), http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/magazine/15-10/st_essay. 
54. Knight, supra note 31, at 554. The commentator goes on to ask, “[I]s our scientific
understanding in some cases biased by a literature that might be inherently more likely to
publish a single erroneous positive finding than dozens of failed attempts to achieve the same
result?” Id.
55. Id.
56. For commentary on the purpose and composition of the public storehouse of know-
ledge, see infra notes 201 and 262.
57. There are several well-publicized examples. See, e.g., Sharon Begley, New Journals
Bet “Negative Results” Save Time, Money, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2006, at B1 (describing how
publication bias suppressing negative results tied to a link between oral contraceptives and
cervical cancer led to erroneous conclusions and wasted time and money). 
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up others to do a wasted redundancy.”58 Unfortunately, this occurs
all the time in scientific research.59
A related concern is that withholding negative results can over-
represent the rate of success—or mask problems—in a particular
field.60 Indeed, “for many current scientific fields, claimed research
findings may often be simply accurate measures of the prevailing
bias.”61 The incomplete information can improperly skew debates,62
lead to an imprudent allocation of resources,63 or even jeopardize
public health.64 Yet despite these potential concerns, an otherwise
58. FETZER, supra note 32, at 17-18.
59. Id.
60. For example, a recent study of publication bias in animal studies found that published
animal trials overestimate by approximately 30 percent that a specific treatment works
because negative results go unpublished. Emily S. Sena et al., Publication Bias in Reports of
Animal Stroke Studies Leads to Major Overstatement of Efficacy, PLOS BIOLOGY, 4 (Mar. 30,
2010), http://www.plosbiology.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pbio.1000344.
61. John P.A. Ioannidis, Why Most Public Research Findings Are False, 2 PLOS MED. 696,
696 (2008).
62. See, e.g., Knight, supra note 31, at 554 (noting how the nonpublication of negative
results pertaining to genetically modified crops has skewed the debate; suggesting that there
are no adverse health effects or environmental consequences). 
63. For example, a funding agency might decide to approve a research proposal that it
otherwise would deny if the agency knew the full story of the research project. BERNARD LO,
ETHICAL ISSUES IN CLINICAL RESEARCH: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 113 (2010) (explaining how
withholding negative results wastes scarce resources because it can direct funding away from
more meritorious research projects).
64. One pharmaceutical company conducting clinical trials for a new drug deliberately
suppressed negative results to make the drug appear safer and more effective than it really
was. See David Egilman & Emily Ardolino, The Pharmaceutical Industry, Disease Industry:
A Prescription for Illness and Death, in THE BOTTOM LINE OR PUBLIC HEALTH: TACTICS
CORPORATIONS USE TO INFLUENCE HEALTH AND HEALTH POLICY, AND WHAT WE CAN DO TO
COUNTER THEM 193, 193-201 (William H. Wiist ed., 2010) (explaining how Merck’s sup-
pression of Vioxx’s negative cardiovascular side effects led to adverse events in patients
including bleeding, heart attacks, and death). One physician explains that “[b]y altering the
apparent risk-benefit ratio of drugs, selective publication can lead doctors to make inap-
propriate prescribing decisions that may not be in the best interest of their patients and, thus,
the public health.” Erick H. Turner et al., Selective Publication of Antidepressant Trials and
Its Influence on Apparent Efficacy, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 252, 259 (2008); cf. Drummond
Rennie & Annette Flanagin, Publication Bias: The Triumph of Hope over Experience, 267
JAMA 411, 412 (1992) (explaining that the editors of the journal accept the view that “when
investigators undertake research involving humans, they take on a public trust that is
violated when [all of] the results are not disseminated by publication” (citation omitted)). In
addition to new federal disclosure requirements, many prestigious medical journals like the
New England Journal of Medicine and the Journal of the American Medical Association refuse
to publish research involving clinical trials unless all of the data is disclosed beforehand in
a public registry. See Catherine De Angelis et al., Clinical Trial Registration: A Statement
from the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1250,
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honest scientist might be tempted to withhold negative results if
doing so increases the possibility of future funding or other aca-
demic rewards.65 
Perhaps the biggest drawback is that nondisclosure causes a drag
on scientific progress.66 Among other things, negative results “serve
to drive the scientific method forward by showing the path not to
follow.”67 Other scientists could possibly fix the error or use the
failed experiment as a building block for other scientific endeavors.68
But nondisclosure condemns this valuable technical information to
the sea of squandered knowledge.69
b. For Patent Law 
All research endeavors—including failed experiments—produce
technical information that can contribute to the public storehouse
of technical knowledge.70 Although the composition of the storehouse
clearly impacts science, it also affects patent law because determin-
ing whether an invention satisfies the substantive standards of
patentability depends on its relation and potential contribution to
the storehouse.71 This is yet another example of how scientific norms
can affect patent law.72 
1250-51 (2004) (presenting the new publication policy of the International Committee of
Medical Journal Editors member journals); infra note 161 (discussing the federally mandated
disclosure requirements of clinical trial results for drugs subject to FDA regulation).
65. CYNTHIA CROSSEN, TAINTED TRUTH: THE MANIPULATION OF FACT IN AMERICA 167
(1994). Such behavior may not be overt, “but it’s the kind of thing where you might be tempted
to put a more glowing cast on a medium-successful outcome because if the results are good,
you might be invited to go to a meeting in San Francisco next year to give a presentation.” Id.
(quoting a medical ethicist).
66. Goetz, supra note 53; see also Turner et al., supra note 64, at 259 (arguing that the
nondisclosure of negative results in drug studies “hinder[s] the advancement of medical
knowledge”). 
67. Alcantara et al., supra note 39, at 1 (emphasis added).
68. See ANDREW HARGADON, HOW BREAKTHROUGHS HAPPEN: THE SURPRISING TRUTH
ABOUT HOW COMPANIES INNOVATE 55-57 (2003) (describing the role of failed experiments in
innovation); supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
69. See Alcantara et al., supra note 39, at 1 (“There is a huge untapped resource of experi-
mental data locked up in laboratory notebooks that could be of great service to the scientific
community.”); P. Bryan Heidorn, Shedding Light on the Dark Data in the Long Tail of Science,
57 LIBR. TRENDS 280, 286-88 (2008) (describing the benefits of bringing “dark data” to light).
70. See infra note 262.
71. See infra Part III.A.
72. See, e.g., Seymore, supra note 4 (proposing a disclosure regime that would allow
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II. HARVESTING SQUANDERED KNOWLEDGE
A. Why a Patent-Like Document?
In theory, there are a variety of ways to harvest negative results
from the sea of squandered knowledge. Given the importance of this
information to both scientists and patent examiners, the challenge
is to design a regime whose costs of disclosure, in terms of both time
and risk, are low for researchers and that also puts the captured
technical information into a repository readily accessible to patent
examiners, other researchers, and members of the interested
public.73 This Subsection explains why a patent-like document is the
best disclosure mechanism to achieve these goals.
1. Risky Alternatives 
Despite the growing awareness of the usefulness of negative
results, very little progress has been made in harvesting this infor-
mation. Efforts include one journal’s willingness to publish negative
results as long as the quality of the submitted data “meet[s] the
same rigorous standards that [the] journal applies to all other
submissions”;74 an open-access website75 for researchers to post
preliminary findings, including negative results, as a “complement”
to the formal peer review process;76 and the creation of a handful of
patents to compete with other forms of technical literature as a source of substantive technical
information); Seymore, supra note 33 (arguing that although accidental discoveries pervade
science, inventors who invent by accident can be unjustly deprived of patents because such
discoveries do not mesh with the substantive law of invention); Sean B. Seymore, Heightened
Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, 56 UCLA L. REV. 127 (2008) (proposing a new approach
for examining patent applications in unpredictable technologies that, by requiring applicants
to disclose actual experimental results, resolves a striking incongruity between patent law
and the experimental sciences).
73. Of course, there must also be sufficient inducements to encourage individual
researchers to participate. See infra Part II.B.
74. Ulrich Dirnagl & Martin Lauritzen, Fighting Publication Bias: Introducing the
Negative Results Section, 30 J. CEREBRAL BLOOD FLOW & METABOLISM 1263, 1264 (2010)
(describing the journal’s author guidelines for submitting negative results). 
75. NATURE PRECEDINGS, http://precedings.nature.com (last visited Mar. 28, 2012). 
76. Andrea Gawrylewski, New Site Pits ‘Published’ vs. ‘Posted,’ THE SCIENTIST (June 19,
2007, 08:46 PM GMT), http://www.the-scientist.com/news/display/53294/ (quoting the Director
of Web Publishing at Nature Publishing Group).
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open-access, peer-reviewed nonprint journals that explicitly target
manuscripts disclosing negative results.77 
Though laudable, these efforts have neither attracted many sub-
missions nor induced any perceptible change in scientific norms.
This is understandable because publishing in these forums carries
significant risks. For example, although everyone in science knows
that most experiments fail,78 listing a publication in a negative re-
sults journal on a curriculum vitae can nevertheless tarnish a
scientist’s reputation.79 And then there is the Ingelfinger Rule80—a
policy followed by many prominent journals stating that a journal
will only consider a manuscript for publication if the findings have
not been previously published elsewhere.81 Fearful that a misstep
might jeopardize their chances of publication in a prestigious jour-
nal, it is understandable why scientists tread carefully in prepubli-
cation activities involving either positive or negative results.82 
77. See Deepak Kanojia, Journal of Negative Results, 90 CURRENT SCI. 8, 8 (2006) (listing
five journals). The most recent entrants are the All Results Journals—launched in 2010 as
a collection of individual negative results journals in biology, chemistry, nanotechnology, and
physics. These journals share a common focus:
At present, more than 60% of the experiments fail to produce results or expected
discoveries. This high percentage of “failed” research generates high level
knowledge. But generally, all these negative experiments have not been
published anywhere .... The main objective of The All Results Journals focuses
on recovering and publishing negative results, valuable pieces of information in
[s]cience. These experiments are considered a vital key for the development of
science and the catalyst for a real science-based empirical knowledge.
THE ALL RESULTS JOURNALS, http://www.arjournals.com (last visited Mar. 28, 2012) (emphasis
omitted).
78. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
79. See Gawrylewski, supra note 76 (exploring the risk in the context of tenure review);
supra note 52 and accompanying text.
80. See Editorial, Definition of “Sole Contribution,” 281 NEW ENG. J. MED. 676, 676-77
(1969) (articulating the rule). Frank Ingelfinger was the editor of the New England Journal
of Medicine from 1967 to 1977. See VINCENT KIERNAN, EMBARGOED SCIENCE 18-21 (2006)
(providing history and commentary).
81. A survey of journal publishers revealed that almost three-fourths of them adhere to
the rule. KIERNAN, supra note 80, at 19; see also Marcia Angell & Jerome P. Kassirer, The
Ingelfinger Rule Revisited, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1371, 1371-73 (1991) (arguing that the rule
is necessary to preserve the journal’s “newsworthiness” and to ensure that medical research
has been subjected to appropriate peer review before it is publicized); Arnold S. Relman, The
Ingelfinger Rule, 305 NEW ENG. J. MED. 824, 824-26 (1981) (same).
82. See DENNIS MEREDITH, EXPLAINING RESEARCH: HOW TO REACH KEY AUDIENCES TO
ADVANCE YOUR WORK 100 (2010) (advising scientists to be preemptive in protecting their
scientific publications and listing prominent journals that adhere to the rule, including the
New England Journal of Medicine; Science, Nature, Cell, Proceedings of the National Academy
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To the extent that these issues primarily affect academic
scientists, disclosing negative results in patent documents does not
present these risks.83 This is largely because patents were long
ignored or avoided by academic scientists because they were
seemingly incongruent with the norms and incentives of academic
research.84 For instance, one line of thought urges that scientific
knowledge is common knowledge—reinforced by full and open
communication of research findings.85 Incentives like patents were
considered unnecessary, at least in academic settings, because
scientists pursue “knowledge for knowledge’s sake.”86 But scientific
norms have adapted to accommodate patents,87 perhaps because
they can generate and reinforce academic rewards,88 serve as a rev-
of Sciences; Journal of the American Medical Association; and journals of the American
Chemical Society).
83. For instance, though there has been some wrangling about which of the various forms
of online posting constitute prior publication for the purposes of the Ingelfinger Rule, patent
documents have not drawn attention. See CHRISTINE L. BORGMAN, SCHOLARSHIP IN THE
DIGITAL AGE: INFORMATION, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND THE INTERNET 98-99 (2007) (exploring the
rule in the Internet age).
84. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1017 (1989) (“Yet the idea that exclusive rights in
new knowledge will promote scientific progress is counterintuitive to many observers of re-
search science, who believe that science advances most rapidly when the community enjoys
free access to new discoveries.”); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of
Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 184 (1987) (explaining that to the extent
that patents “limit the ability of other scientists to use published knowledge, intellectual
property law has been perceived within the scientific research community as conflicting with
the traditional norms and rewards of science”). 
85. ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL
INVESTIGATIONS 274 (Norman W. Storer ed., 1973); see also John M. Golden, Principles for
Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505, 521-22 (2010) (describing the substantial norm of
secrecy with respect to innovation and scientific discovery that once existed); Arti Kaur Rai,
Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW.
U. L. REV. 77, 89-94 (1999) (exploring the conflict between scientific norms favoring broad and
rapid dissemination of knowledge and commercial norms favoring secrecy and proprietary
rights in that knowledge).
86. Fiona Murray, The Oncomouse that Roared: Hybrid Exchange Strategies as a Source
of Distinction at the Boundary of Overlapping Institutions, 116 AM. J. SOC. 341, 348 (2010).
87. Peter Lee, Contracting to Preserve Open Science: Consideration-Based Regulation in
Patent Law, 58 EMORY L.J. 889, 943-44 (2009); see also Murray, supra note 86, at 350
(describing the emerging porous boundary between academic and commercial science); Fiona
Murray & Scott Stern, When Ideas Are Not Free: The Impact of Patents on Scientific Research,
in 7 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 33, 52 (Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2007)
(explaining that patents have been “co-opted into science” and “have become part of every day
scientific life”).
88. See Murray, supra note 86, at 375-76 (explaining that academic scientists have started
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enue source for research,89 and merge with journal articles as a
mechanism for knowledge transfer.90 
2. The Well-Established Framework of Patent Information 
The patent literature—comprising patent documents and pub-
lished patent applications—is “the most highly concentrated
collection[ ] of technical information” in the world.91 It consists of
over 80 million published patent documents worldwide92 spanning
all possible technical fields and growing by about 1.5 million docu-
ments per year.93 Most of the information disclosed in patent
documents is never published elsewhere.94
to recognize that patents can provide scientific credit and help attract industrial interest and
support for research projects); Sean B. Seymore, The “Printed Publication” Bar After
Klopfenstein: Has the Federal Circuit Changed the Way Professors Should Talk About
Science?, 40 AKRON L. REV. 493, 500 n.43 (2007) (noting that some universities consider
patents favorably in promotion and tenure decisions).
89. Robert P. Merges, Property Rights Theory and the Commons: The Case of Scientific
Research, in SCIENTIFIC INNOVATION, PHILOSOPHY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 145, 155 (Ellen Frankel
Paul et al. eds., 1996). “Regardless of what motivates a scientist ... he or she cannot make any
progress in the vast majority of scientific disciplines without a great deal of money.” Id.
90. Murray, supra note 86, at 345 (citing Ajay Agrawal & Rebecca M. Henderson, Putting
Patents in Context: Exploring Knowledge Transfer at MIT, 48 MGMT. SCI. 44, 47-60 (2002)
(presenting an empirical study of faculty patenting and publishing behavior)); Murray &
Stern, supra note 87, at 52 (explaining that scientists “are more active participants in building
commercial strategies around patents ... even while they continue to publish in prestigious
scientific journals”).
91. Doreen Alberts et al., Introduction to Patent Searching, in CURRENT CHALLENGES IN
PATENT INFORMATION RETRIEVAL 3, 7 (Mihai Lupu et al. eds., 2011); see also DAVID HUNT ET
AL., PATENT SEARCHING: TOOLS & TECHNIQUES 110 (2007). 
92. See, e.g., Press Release, CPA Global Ltd., World’s Most Sophisticated Patent Research
Platform, CPA Global Discover, Soon to Be Launched (Sept. 29, 2010), available at http://
www.cpaglobal.com/media_centre/press_releases/4674/ (explaining that the new search plat-
form will allow customers to access more than eighty million patent documents from ninety
jurisdictions in seconds).
93. SHAHID ALIKHAN & RAGHUNATH MASHELKAR, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 8 (2d ed. 2009).
94. WALKER, supra note 44, at 1 (“[M]uch of the information appearing in patent docu-
ments is never published in any other format, including the [archival] journal.”); see also JILL
LAMBERT & PETER A. LAMBERT, FINDING INFORMATION IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND
MEDICINE 9 (2003) (estimating that about 15 percent of the technical information disclosed
in patents is available elsewhere); Esteban Burrone & Guriqbal Singh Jaiya, Intellectual
Property (IP) Rights and Innovation in Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 3 (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/documents/pdf/iprs_innovation.pdf (“It
has been estimated that patent documents contain 70% of the world’s accumulated technical
knowledge and that most of the information contained in patent documents is either never
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Another hallmark of the patent literature is its searchability.95
When compared to other information sources,96 the patent literature
stands apart in its overall level of organization and accessibility.97
All patent documents adhere to a standardized, predictable format
that includes bibliographic information such as a title, abstract,
filing date, citations to other documents, and the inventor’s name.
To facilitate retrieval, the technical content of each document is
catalogued and indexed in a hierarchical classification system that
covers all fields of technology and therefore represents the entire
body of searchable technical information.98 The level of uniformity
between individual patent documents, regardless of origin, is ex-
tremely consistent.99 This is not the case with other types of tech-
nical literature, which vary widely in their levels of organization100
and coverage.101 
published elsewhere or is first disclosed through the publication of the patent application.”).
95. See Alberts et al., supra note 91, at 6 (explaining that “buckets” of technical
information can be grouped based on the extent to which each is readily searchable). The term
“searchable” refers to seeking information from an electronic database or retrieving and
reviewing print materials. Id.
96. The body of searchable technical information can be divided into three types: the
patent literature; technical journals; and everything else (conference proceedings, product
literature, textbooks, drawings, diagrams, industry publications, etc.). Id. 
97. Cf. id. at 7 (using four metrics, rather than just organization and accessibility, to
gauge searchability).
98. There are two major patent classification systems. The PTO uses the U.S. Patent
Classification system (USPC), which divides all technical subject matter into over 450 main
classes and approximately 150,000 subclasses. See MANUAL OF PATENT CLASSIFICATION, http://
www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/help.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2012). Most coun-
tries use the World Intellectual Property Organization’s International Patent Classification
system (IPC), which divides patentable technologies into 8 main sections, 120 classes, 640
subclasses, and about 70,000 groups. See INT’L PATENT CLASSIFICATION (IPC), http://www.
wipo.int/classifications/ipc/en/faq/index.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2012). Both systems are
regularly revised and amended to follow technological progress.
99. Alberts et al., supra note 91, at 7.
100. With technical journals, “[t]he level of uniformity between documents is mostly
consistent, however, the data fields that journal-grade literature documents have in common
are many fewer than patent documents ...[, which] yields fewer and less sophisticated options
to search the data.” Id. at 8. At the far end of the spectrum are all other forms of literature,
which “are scattered across all reaches and resources ... [and] under most circumstances need
to be searched separately.” Id.
101. The point here is that sometimes the exact scope of information being searched is
unknown. For example, given that a significant amount of technical journal literature re-
mains undigitized, and must be searched manually within printed publications, a compre-
hensive search might require a considerable amount of effort that extends beyond searching
a literature database. Id. 
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The patent literature is also extremely accessible. The digital age
now makes patent documents available to all interested parties
either through free-of-charge patent information databases102 or
through commercial databases that offer value-added tools.103 This
makes the patent literature the greatest publicly-accessible tech-
nical library in the world.104 
Taken together, these characteristics of the patent literature
further explain why a patent-like document—the null patent—is the
best medium for disseminating negative results.105 It would strongly
resemble other patent documents in structure, format, and content,
including a detailed description of the work performed—such as
sufficient technical information to replicate the failed experiment106
—and bibliographic information. Perhaps the key difference be-
tween the null patent and a traditional patent is that the former
would lack claims. This does not matter because from a knowledge
perspective, patent documents are not important for their legal
significance but rather for the volume of technical knowledge that
they disclose to the public.107 And like other patent documents, this
technical knowledge could be catalogued and indexed using an
established hierarchical classification system. Thus, a collection of
null patents could be structured into an information database in
much the same way as the current patent literature. In theory, this
102. See, e.g., USTPO PATENT FULL-TEXT DATABASES, supra note 26 (U.S. patent docu-
ments); EPO-ESPACENET, http://www.epo.org/searching/free/espacenet.html (last visited Mar.
28, 2012) (Europe’s patent databases); PATENTSCOPE, http://www.wipo.int/patentscope/
en/dbsearch/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2012) (database of all patent applications filed under the
Patent Cooperation Treaty and links to patent databases in more than twenty-five nations).
103. A value-added tool adds material to the information that it retrieves, such as an
abstract prepared by a subject-matter expert or information about related patent documents.
HUNT ET AL., supra note 91, at 82 & 107 n.23; see, e.g., Derwent World Patents Index,
THOMSON REUTERS, http://thomsonreuters.com/products_services/legal/legal_products/a-z/
derwent_world_patents_index/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2012) (the best-known and most
comprehensive collection of value-added patent documents).
104. See sources cited supra note 91.
105. Again, the word “null” has two implications: first, that the experimental results
disclosed within the document did not produce the expected outcome; and second, that the
document would have no legal effect vis-à-vis a traditional patent. See supra note 23.
106. See infra Part II.B.2. The sufficiency of the detailed description would be determined
by scientific norms. 
107. STEPHEN R. ADAMS, INFORMATION SOURCES IN PATENTS 4 (2d ed. 2006).
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would allow free open-access searching akin to, and perhaps
concurrently with, other patent information databases.108
3. The Need to Mitigate the PTO’s Information Deficit 
It is worth reiterating that the purpose of the null patent is
twofold: first, to serve as a medium for disclosing and disseminating
negative results; and second, to put that information into the exam-
iner’s hands for assessing patentability.109 Although there might be
other ways to achieve the former, the null patent’s ability to achieve
both goals makes it unique. 
Recall that an examiner is more likely to assert references found
in patent databases than from other information sources,110 es-
sentially making the former “a sort of filing cabinet of all human
knowledge.”111 This raises the question of who should host the null
patent information database—the PTO or a third party. The PTO
might be preferable for at least two reasons. First, if it is true that
“[e]xaminers give more weight to their own database[s],”112 then
hosting the null patent database at the PTO would increase the
chances that an examiner would search it.113 Second, the PTO
already knows how to build and maintain a patent-like information
database.114 Since 1985, inventors who decide not to obtain a patent
can pay a hefty fee115 and request that the PTO publish the tech-
108. It appears that the PTO has the capacity and expertise to implement this type of
framework. See infra notes 116-20 and accompanying text. 
109. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
111. James Gleick, Patently Absurd, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 12, 2000, at 44.
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 20, at 102 (“The predominance of ... U.S. patents [as
cited prior art] may ... reflect the limitations of the PTO systems for searching: the PTO is
much more likely to find documents that it itself has generated.”); John R. Thomas, Collusion
and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L.
REV. 305, 318 (“In comparison to much of the [nonpatent] literature, patents are readily
accessible, conveniently classified and printed in a common format. Identification of a
[nonpatent] reference, and full comprehension of its contents, often prove[s] to be more
difficult.”).
114. Cf. Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747, 1783-90
(2011) (arguing that in deciding which institutional actor is best equipped to make patent
policy choices, the PTO is best equipped to do so because of its expertise, ability to gather
relevant information, and other reasons).
115. See infra note 116. Recall that publishing in the null patent database would be free.
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nical details in a patent-like document called a Statutory Invention
Registration (SIR).116 Like the null patent, SIRs lack claims and
therefore confer no legal rights.117 But more importantly, published
SIRs “are classified, cross-referenced, ... placed in the search files,
disseminated to foreign patent offices, stored in [PTO] computer
tapes, [and] made available in commercial data bases.”118 The
existence of the SIR program, which is set to be eliminated as part
of patent reform,119 shows that the PTO has the experience and
infrastructure required to develop and maintain the null patent
information database.120 
Including the null patent database in the examiner’s suite of
online search tools121 would expand the universe of easily-accessible
116. See Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984 § 102, 35 U.S.C. § 157 (2006) (repealed
2011). The purpose of an SIR is to dedicate the disclosed subject matter to the public, meaning
that an SIR becomes prior art when it publishes. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL
OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1111 (8th ed. 8th rev. 2010) [hereinafter MPEP] (“[A]
published SIR will be treated the same as a U.S. patent for all defensive purposes, usable as
a reference as of its filing date in the same manner as a patent.”). The PTO may grant an SIR
if three conditions are met. First, the disclosed subject matter must satisfy the enablement,
written description, and best mode requirements of paragraph 1 of § 112. See § 157(a)(1).
Second, the applicant must pay filing, processing, and publication fees. § 157(a)(4). Third, the
applicant must waive the right to receive a patent on the disclosed subject matter. § 157(a)(3).
As of 2010, the fee to publish an SIR can be as high as $1840. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.17 (n)-(o)
(2010) (presenting the SIR fee schedule).
117. See 35 U.S.C. § 157(a)(3), (b) (stating that upon publication, the applicant for an SIR
waives the right to receive a patent on the disclosed subject matter); § 157(c) (stating that,
inter alia, an SIR does not confer the right to a remedy for patent infringement). 
118. MPEP, supra note 116, § 1111. Though SIRs are expensive, they can be an excellent
source of prior art because the examiner is obliged to search them when they reside in the
PTO’s own databases. See infra note 120.
119. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, H.R. Res. 1249, 112th Cong. § 103(c) (2011)
(enacted) (repealing 35 U.S.C. § 157).
120. One might ask if a researcher could currently use an SIR as a medium for disclosing
negative results. The answer is no, primarily because SIRs must disclose enabled subject
matter. See supra note 116. Now that most patent applications publish automatically eighteen
months after filing, SIRs are often unnecessary because an inventor who wants the subject
matter to enter the public domain can simply abandon the application after its publication.
See MPEP, supra note 116, § 1120(II). With that said, from a strategic point of view, SIRs are
an excellent source of prior art. See ADAMS, supra note 107, at 50 (“The inventor, by
deliberately laying open their invention, will ensure that the information is in the public
domain and unpatentable in other jurisdictions as well.”); supra note 118.
121. See MPEP, supra note 116, § 901.06(a)(IV)(B) (listing several online search tools
available to aid examiners in discharging their duties); Iain M. Cockburn, Samuel Kortum &
Scott Stern, Are All Patent Examiners Equal? Examiners, Patent Characteristics, and
Litigation Outcomes, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 19, 24-25 (Wesley M.
Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003) (describing how examiners conduct searches with
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technical information and might do much to mitigate the current
information deficit in the PTO.
B. Incentivizing Disclosure
1. The Challenge
Having explained why the null patent is the best medium for dis-
seminating negative results, the next question is how to encourage
researchers to disclose them. There is little doubt that disclosure is
the biggest hurdle for capturing, and ultimately disseminating,
negative information.122 Overcoming this hurdle is difficult not only
because of the file drawer problem123 but also because of differences
between industrial and academic science,124 differences within each
of the two sectors and across disciplines,125 and potential trade
patent databases and other forms of technical literature).
122. See Cross, supra note 22, at 623 (recognizing the disclosure problem).
123. See supra Part I.B.
124. See Henry Sauermann & Paula E. Stephan, Twins or Strangers? Differences and
Similarities Between Industrial and Academic Science 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 16113, 2010), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16113.pdf; see also
DAVID B. RESNIK, THE PRICE OF TRUTH: HOW MONEY AFFECTS THE NORMS OF SCIENCE 41
(2007) (describing the traditional differences between industrial and academic science,
including those related to research independence, motivation, and the freedom to decide how
and to whom data will be shared). For a discussion of disclosure norms between the academic
and industrial sectors, see ALAN L. PORTER & SCOTT W. CUNNINGHAM, TECH MINING:
EXPLOITING NEW TECHNOLOGIES FOR COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 10 (2005) (showing empirically
that academic scientists contribute most of all publicly available R&D and are more likely to
publish research than their industrial counterparts). But as the line between academic and
industrial science continues to blur, disclosure norms also evolve. See Sauermann & Stephan,
supra, at 3 (“[S]cientists in both sectors publish extensively, with 60% of scientists in industry
having published in a 5-year span. Over the same period, 16% of academics have applied for
a patent.”); supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., Walter W. Powell & Jason Owen-Smith, The New World of Knowledge
Production in the Life Sciences, in THE FUTURE OF THE CITY OF INTELLECT: THE CHANGING
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 107, 107-09, 111-15 (Steven Brint ed., 2002) (noting that unlike other
technical disciplines, in the life sciences there is no longer a distinction between basic or
applied research, academic or industrial practice, or proprietary or scientific approaches to
information disclosure); Sauermann & Stephan, supra note 124, at 3 (explaining that the
differences between academic and industrial practice are smaller in the life sciences than in
the physical sciences); see also TAMAS BARTFAI & GRAHAM V. LEES, DRUG DISCOVERY: FROM
BEDSIDE TO WALL STREET 86-87 (2006) (explaining that disclosure norms at pharmaceutical
companies have evolved to openly and extensively disclose positive results, in part to attract
academic collaborators and reassure investors).
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secret concerns for researchers who change jobs.126 Furthermore,
designing a disclosure scheme presents a twofold challenge: first, to
devise a mechanism for knowledge capture that is not so burden-
some or complex that it is impractical; and second, to create specific
inducements that would motivate individual researchers to
participate.127 
Although there is no easy solution to the disclosure problem, the
three subsections that follow propose a framework to mitigate it.
Though it is hard to predict the quantum of negative information
that the framework could capture, given the infinitesimal amount
that is currently disclosed,128 this Article takes the position that any
information that the framework’s implementation could harvest
from the sea of squandered knowledge would be a substantial im-
provement over the status quo.
2. A Straightforward Scheme for Knowledge Capture
Capturing negative results, at least in theory, should be straight-
forward. This is because it is gospel in research to record the details
of all experiments—successes and failures—in a laboratory note-
book.129 The notebook is the official documentation system in
126. Although a full discussion is beyond the scope of this Article, the drafters of the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act believed that negative know-how can be protected as intellectual
property. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (amended 1985) (defining “trade secret” to
“include[ ] information that has commercial value from a negative viewpoint, for example the
results of lengthy and expensive research which proves that a certain process will not work
could be of great value to a competitor”) (emphasis omitted). Negative know-how has been
described as a “strange[] theory of trade secret law ... under which an employee who resigns
and joins a different business can be liable for not repeating the mistakes ... of his or her
former employer.” Charles Tait Graves, The Law of Negative Knowledge: A Critique, 15 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 387, 388 (2007) (emphasis added). Graves argues that the doctrine is
“conceptually unworkable”; “bestows intellectual property rights in accidents, mistakes,
incorrect theories, failed tests, dead ends, and obsolete approaches”; and “[lacks] the usual
theoretical justification for intellectual property.” Id. at 388. To be sure, the case law is split
in the handful of states that recognize negative know-how. See ROGER MILGRIM & ERIC E.
BENSEN, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.02[1] n.21 (2010) (collecting cases).
127. Cf. Patil & Siegel, supra note 31, at 523 (“[A]lthough the arguments in favor of
[publishing negative results] all seem to revolve around benefits to the community, the costs
of [disclosure] would fall on individual authors. If the community is to reap the benefits, then
the costs to the individual authors must be driven to zero—or associated with some reward.”).
128. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
129. See KATHY BARKER, AT THE BENCH: A LABORATORY NAVIGATOR 89-98 (2005)
(explaining how to maintain a laboratory notebook).
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scientific research, which captures everything done on a research
project, including results, data interpretation, and observations.130
Whereas successful experiments are eventually written up for
publication elsewhere, the current norm in science is to leave the
negative results behind in the notebook.131 
A modern trend in laboratory knowledge management should
make it fairly easy to extract negative results from the notebook.
Electronic laboratory notebooks (ELNs) are computer systems that
create, store, archive, retrieve, and share records, data, and other
technical information in the research laboratory.132 ELNs have
become quite popular in both academic and industrial research and
“will eventually be used by all R&D scientists to record all of their
research, and will become their central application.”133 
Three key features of ELNs are important for present purposes.
First, unlike paper notebooks, ELNs are designed to facilitate the
sharing of information.134 Although sharing clearly impacts the
infrastructural aspects of the ELN software, it might also improve
the substantive technical content vis-à-vis a paper notebook because
researchers are “a bit more particular” when recording information
that they know will be shared.135 Second, ELNs can fully integrate
with external databases, meaning that ELNs can send information
to databases and receive information from them over the Internet.136
Third, ELNs accommodate user-configurable and third-party tem-
130. MAXINE LINTERN, LABORATORY SKILLS FOR SCIENCE AND MEDICINE: AN INTRODUCTION
45-46 (2007).
131. See supra Part I.B.
132. Ping Du & Joseph A. Kofman, Electronic Laboratory Notebooks in Pharmaceutical
R&D: On the Road to Maturity, 12 J. ASS’N LAB. AUTOMATION 157, 158 (2007).
133. Keith T. Taylor, The Status of Electronic Laboratory Notebooks for Chemistry and
Biology, 9 CURRENT OPINION DRUG DISCOVERY & DEV. 348, 351 (2006) (emphasis added).
Examples of major companies that had implemented ELNs as of 2007 include AstraZeneca,
Eli Lilly, Johnson & Johnson, Merck, and Schering Plough. See Du & Kofman, supra note 132,
at 164.
134. See Editorial, Share Your Lab Notes, 447 NATURE 1-2 (2007) (describing the
collaborative benefits of ELNs); sources cited supra notes 132-33.
135. Declan Butler, A New Leaf, 436 NATURE 20, 20 (2005) (quoting a researcher who also
states that “it’s easy to be sloppy when writing a [non-ELN] personal lab book”).
136. See, e.g., Michael Rubacha, Anil K. Rattan & Stephen C. Hosselet, A Review of
Electronic Laboratory Notebooks Available in the Market Today, 16 J. ASS’N LAB. AUTOMATION
90, 90-91, 93-97 (2011) (exploring features of thirty-five commercially available ELNs).
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plates, enabling them to generate documents and transmit technical
information in a standardized format.137 
When viewed together, these features reveal that ELNs could
serve as conduits for the transfer of knowledge from the research
laboratory to the null patent information database.138 More con-
cretely, it is conceivable that if a null patent template were avail-
able, ELN software could compile the data, observations, and other
technical information from a failed experiment and create a null
patent document in a standardized format. With a few mouse clicks,
the null patent could be transmitted to the null patent information
database. Thus, “[t]he act of conducting research would ... become
practically synonymous with the act of disseminating the resulting
knowledge.”139 
3. Quid Pro Quo Incentives
Perhaps the most basic strategy for incentivizing disclosure is to
give the researcher something in return—a quid pro quo situation.
The quid pro quo rationale for patents is to incentivize the disclo-
sure of information that the public might not otherwise get.140 For
the patentee, the incentive for full public disclosure of the invention
is the limited period of exclusory rights.141 For the public, the
exchange serves the public good because the disclosed information
137. See id. at 93-97.
138. Although considerably less precise about the mechanics and contours, two commen-
tators have floated a similar idea of using electronic laboratory records to disseminate
negative results:
We are increasingly keeping scientific records in electronic form; it would be
straightforward to wrap our notebook pages describing [a negative] result with
a bit of searchable text, generate a web page, and submit the whole thing to a
database.... Along the way, we would have to spend some energy improving the
records that we keep in order to ensure that our notebooks were more accessible
to outside readers.
Patil & Siegel, supra note 31, at 524.
139. Id.
140. WALTERSCHEID, supra note 1, at 143.
141. See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001)
(“The disclosure required by the Patent Act is the quid pro quo of the right to exclude.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81
(1974) (describing the quid pro quo that supports the patent grant as a constitutional
objective).
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enriches the public storehouse of technical knowledge once the
patent document publishes.142
In parallel to traditional patents, the null patent regime postu-
lates that disclosure of negative information would also enrich
public knowledge.143 But because a null patent would not confer
exclusory rights,144 the question becomes what could serve as a
surrogate incentive.
Although one could envision several possibilities,145 this Article
focuses on two specific types: PTO-based incentives and publication
incentives. The first type would target researchers who patent.
Conceivably, the PTO could incentivize participation in the null
patent program by providing patentees with a perk during patent
examination. For example, in exchange for filing one null patent,
the PTO could expedite its review of another, traditional, patent
application. Or, perhaps in exchange for filing one null patent, the
PTO could provide a fee discount for any service that it provides.
These incentives seem feasible because the PTO already uses—or
plans to use—fast-track examination146 and fee reductions147 to
achieve certain objectives.148 Finally, to help ensure that the dis-
142. For commentary on the purpose and composition of the public storehouse of
knowledge, see infra notes 201 and 262. It must be emphasized that “the patent document has
potential immediate value to the public, which can use the information for any purpose that
does not infringe upon the claims.” Seymore, supra note 4, at 624 (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
143. See discussion supra Part II.A.; infra Part III.B.2.
144. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 22, at 623-24 (exploring the idea of a royalty system and
then identifying the major problems and pitfalls). 
146. See Changes to Implement the Prioritized Examination Track (Track I) of the
Enhanced Examination Timing Control Procedures, 76 Fed. Reg. 18,399, 18,400 (Apr. 4, 2011)
(to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) (describing a program that allows applicants to accelerate
examination to one year).
147. For example, Congress has directed the PTO to reduce fees for independent inventors
and other small entities. See 35 U.S.C. § 41(h)(1) (2006) (mandating a 50 percent reduction).
One statutory objective is to provide incentives to invent and patent. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-
382, at 13 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1320, 1328 (explaining that “the small entity
fee structure is important to encourage innovation in the United States” because without it,
independent inventors “would be disinclined to protect their inventions because of a lack of
resources”).
148. See, e.g., Request for Comments on Incentivizing Humanitarian Technologies and
Licensing Through the Intellectual Property System, 75 Fed. Reg. 57,261, 57,261 (Sept. 20,
2010) (requesting comments for a pilot program that would offer an ex parte reexamination
voucher to patentees demonstrating humanitarian uses of patented technologies “as an
incentive to stimulate technology creation ... that addresses humanitarian needs”).
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closed negative information is fully disclosed and legitimate,149 the
null patentee could be held subject to the duty of candor and good
faith owed by patent applicants to the PTO.150 
The second type of incentives would target researchers who
choose to publish in the peer-reviewed literature. Like the PTO,
journal editors could provide perks to those researchers who disclose
negative results through the null patent program. For example,
consortia of journals151 could agree that a researcher who files a null
patent would receive an expedited review of a manuscript submitted
to any of the member journals. In terms of feasibility, expedited
review is already used by many journals, often as a mechanism to
quickly disseminate important new research.152 Although this perk
would clearly benefit the researcher, it would also benefit the
journal editors because they could foster the dissemination of
negative results153 without having to sacrifice space in their own
publications.154 
149. For a discussion of the sufficiency of disclosure, see supra note 106 and accompanying
text.
150. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2011) (“Each individual associated with the filing and prosecution
of a patent application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the Office.”); cf.
Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 488 F.3d 982, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(“[Patent applicants] have a duty to prosecute patent applications in the Patent Office with
candor, good faith, and honesty.”). As the Federal Circuit has explained, “[a] breach of this
duty—including affirmative misrepresentations of material facts, failure to disclose material
information, or submission of false material information—coupled with an intent to deceive,
constitutes inequitable conduct.” Id. The PTO does not investigate duty of disclosure issues;
rather, inequitable conduct is usually asserted as a defense to patent infringement. MPEP,
supra note 116, § 2010. For traditional patents, a determination of inequitable conduct can
render the patent-at-issue and related patents and patent applications unenforceable. Nilssen
v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 504 F.3d 1223, 1230 (Fed. Cir. 2007). As applied to null patents, a
finding of inequitable conduct could render a patent obtained through the perk unenforceable. 
151. An example of a consortium is the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors
(ICMJE), which includes several hundred member journals. See ICMJE: Journals Following
Uniform Requirements for Manuscripts, ICMJE, http://www.icmje.org/journals.html (last
visited Mar. 28, 2012).
152. See, e.g., Margaret A. Winker & Phil B. Fontanarosa, JAMA-EXPRESS: Rapid Peer
Review and Publication, 281 JAMA ASS’N 1754, 1754-55 (1999) (providing the criteria for
expedited consideration of research results of major importance).
153. The file drawer problem continues to gain traction in the sphere of peer review,
including some attention—and action—from the editors of prestigious journals. See, e.g.,
discussion supra note 64. 
154. See Marvin R. Goldfried & Gary C. Walters, Needed: Publication of Negative Results,
14 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 598, 598 (1959) (noting that space constraints contribute to the
nonpublication of negative results). For criticism of the lack-of-space argument, see Iain
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4. The Special Case of Federally Funded Research
The federal government is heavily involved in funding domestic
research and development efforts.155 It funds nearly 60 percent of
basic research156 and over 25 percent of total research157 conducted
in the United States.158 This means that incentivizing the disclosure
of negative results emerging from federally funded research could
go a long way in shrinking the sea of squandered knowledge. And
because the federal government remains the dominant funding
source for university research, which is mostly basic research sup-
ported by grants from the National Science Foundation and the
National Institutes of Health,159 that incentive would help change
academic attitudes about failure and ultimately transform scientific
norms toward disclosure. 
Chalmers, Underreporting Research Is Scientific Misconduct, 263 JAMA 1405, 1407 (1990)
(“[J]ournal editors should acknowledge that shortage of space in printed journals can no
longer be invoked as a reason for ... [the] underreporting of research.”).
155. Of the nearly $400 billion in total U.S. R&D expenditures in 2007, $116 billion came
from the federal government. See JOHN F. SARGENT, JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41098,
FEDERAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FUNDING: FY2011, at 1 (2010), available at http://
assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41098_20100310.pdf; Michael Yamaner, Federal R&D Support
Shows Little Change in FY 2008, NAT’L SCI. FOUND., 2 tbl.1 (2009), http://www.nsf.gov/
statistics/infbrief/nsf09320/nsf09320.pdf.
156. There are two generally accepted types of research. The first, basic research, consists
of “systematic study directed toward fuller knowledge or understanding of the fundamental
aspects of phenomena and of observable facts without specific applications towards processes
or products in mind.” OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRC. No.
A-11, PREPARATION, SUBMISSION, AND EXECUTION OF THE BUDGET § 84, at 8 (2010).
157. Applied research, the other type, consists of “systematic study to gain knowledge or
understanding necessary to determine the means by which a recognized and specific need may
be met.” Id.
158. See Mark Boroush, National Patterns of R&D Resources: 2008 Data Update, NAT’L SCI.
FOUND., 26 tbl.6 (2010), http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsf10314/pdf/nsf10314.pdf (providing
expenditures for basic research in 2007); id. at 22 tbl.5 (providing expenditures for basic and
applied research in 2007). In 2007, the federal government spent about $26.87 billion on basic
research and $27.23 billion on applied research. Yamaner, supra note 155, at 2 tbl.1.
159. See OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS, NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, HARNESSING SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY FOR AMERICA'S ECONOMIC FUTURE: NATIONAL AND REGIONAL PRIORITIES 33-34
(1999) (“[M]ost basic research is performed in universities, and most university research is
supported by federal agencies.”); Michael Yamaner, Federal Science and Engineering Support
to Universities, Colleges, and Nonprofit Institutions: FY 2007, NAT’L SCI. FOUND., 26-27 tbl.8
(2009), http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsf12301/pdf/nsf12301.pdf (providing figures for federal
research support to universities). In 2007, approximately 60 percent of university research
funding came from federal sources. Boroush, supra note 158, at 22 tbl.5. That same year, more
than 76 percent of university research was basic research. Id. at 22 tbl.5, 26 tbl.6.
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Crafting an incentive, at least in theory, is actually quite simple.
Federal agencies could require funding recipients to disclose the
entire body of experimental data—including negative results
through the null patent information database. Funding recipients
would agree to this policy as a condition of agency support.160
Agencies would gauge compliance throughout or perhaps at the end
of the funding period. They could use a funding recipient’s degree of
compliance to weigh heavily in evaluating requests for continued or
future agency support. 
Though one could argue that agencies would have to develop
larger bureaucratic structures to gauge compliance, that burden
would be justified by a growing push for agencies to give the public,
the scientific community, and Congress greater insight into the
results achieved with federally funded research.161 But in order for
transparency to serve as an effective accountability tool, it is nec-
essary to implement a regime that compels funding recipients to
provide a full and truthful disclosure that accounts for 100 percent
of the research effort.162 This would include experiments that pro-
duced both positive and negative results. The null patent could thus
help provide a more accurate and complete picture of “how federal
research dollars are being spent, what research is being performed,
160. As one commentator has noted, “It is surprising that so many research-funding
organizations do not make an award of funds to researchers conditional on a full report [of all
results] being prepared and published.” Chalmers, supra note 154, at 1407.
161. See, e.g., Food and Drug Modernization Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. § 282(i)-(j) (2006)
(instructing the NIH to establish, in conjunction with the FDA and the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, a publicly accessible clinical trial registry and results database for
drugs, products, or devices subject to FDA regulation); Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009,
42 U.S.C.A. § 282(c) (West 2009) (requiring recipients of NIH funding to make electronic
versions of peer-reviewed manuscripts publicly accessible); America COMPETES Act, 42
U.S.C.A. § 1862o-2 (West 2007) (requiring research outcomes for projects funded by the NSF
be made available to the public in a timely manner electronically); America COMPETES
Reauthorization Act of 2010, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6623 (West 2011) (instructing the Office of Science
and Technology Policy to establish an interagency working group to coordinate public access
to develop policies to help promote the dissemination of the results of federally funded
research).
162. Transparency Through Technology: Evaluating Federal Open-Government Initiatives:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. 3 (2011) (statement
of Jerry Brito, Senior Research Fellow, Mercatus Ctr., George Mason Univ.), available at
http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Brito_Testimony-Bio_3-11-11.pdf. 
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and how the outcomes of research are benefiting society as a
whole.”163
5. An Exceptional Tool for Defensive Publication
The ability to control the technological landscape can provide a
strong incentive to disclose negative results. For instance, dissemi-
nating negative results helps coordinate the future development of
technology by reducing duplicative research efforts and providing
technical fodder that can spur additional innovative activity.164 But
this is only part of the story. Given that negative results can po-
tentially defeat patentability,165 their dissemination can be used
strategically to control the patent landscape around the disclosed
information. Thus, a research organization might engage in defen-
sive publication, which occurs when information “[is] intentionally
made available to the public as prior art in order to render any sub-
sequent claims of invention or discovery ineligible for a patent.”166
With negative results, the expectation is that publishing them will
create an insurmountable obviousness hurdle around the disclosed
information.167
The importance of defensive publication as a strategic tool cannot
be overstated.168 Research organizations use it as a low-cost mech
163. Research Spending and Results, RESEARCH.GOV, http://www.research.gov (follow
“Research Spending and Results” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 28, 2012). The site seeks to
provide a more open and transparent government by sharing the outcomes of federally funded
research projects. See id.
164. See infra notes 318-20 and accompanying text.
165. See discussion supra Part I.B.2(b); infra Part III.A (describing how negative results
can play either a patent-defeating or patent-obtaining role in patentability).
166. STEPHEN A. HANSEN & JUSTIN W. VANFLEET, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A HANDBOOK ON ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE
HOLDERS IN PROTECTING THEIR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND MAINTAINING BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY 24 (2003), available at http://shr.aaas.org/tek/handbook; see also Scott Baker &
Claudio Mezzetti, Disclosure as a Strategy in the Patent Race, 48 J.L. & ECON. 173, 175 (2005)
(explaining that defensive publications “are designed to preempt patents in instances in which
the disclosing firm does not itself plan to pursue patent protection but fears that its rivals
might”).
167. Baker & Mezzetti, supra note 166, at 175-76; infra Part III.A.2 (discussing
nonobviousness). For a scenario in which experimental failure can be used to establish
nonobviousness, see infra note 237 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., Bill Barrett, Defensive Use of Publications in an Intellectual Property
Strategy, 20 NATURE BIOTECH. 191, 191-93 (2002) (providing specific drafting strategies for
creating prior art); Douglas Lichtman, Scott Baker & Kate Kraus, Strategic Disclosure in the
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anism both for preventing competitors from obtaining patents and
for guaranteeing the organization’s freedom to practice:
[A]s the costs of patent applications and litigation continue to
rise[,] defensive publishing is offering scientists another option:
by making published descriptions of their innovative research
products available to the public, they prevent others from
patenting them, thus they ensure the results’ continued avail-
ability without incurring the significant legal and filing fees
involved in patenting.169
Thus, defensive publication can serve as a key element in a research
organization’s overall intellectual property management strategy.170 
Venues for defensive publication abound. They include company-
generated prior art journals,171 commercial prior art websites,172
peer-reviewed literature,173 and patent documents.174 These venues
vary widely in financial cost, human capital required to prepare
them, timeliness, and accessibility.175 Clearly, the incentive to
Patent System, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2175, 2175-76 (2000) (discussing a research organization’s
strategic incentive to create prior art); Gideon Parchomovsky, Publish or Perish, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 926, 927 (2000) (same).
169. Stephen Adams & Victoria Henson-Apollonio, Defensive Publishing: A Strategy for
Maintaining Intellectual Property as Public Goods, INT’L SERV. FOR NAT’L AGRIC. RES., Briefing
Paper No. 53, 2002, at 2, available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACS088.pdf (citing
Richard Poynder, On the Defensive About Invention, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 19, 2001).
170. Id. at 1-2. Indeed, defensive publication can be “a ‘spoiler’ tactic—you disclose your
technology without pursuing patent protection for yourself just to be sure that no one else can
have a patent for it either.” Anthony Murphy, Intellectual Property, in INNOVATION:
HARNESSING CREATIVITY FOR BUSINESS GROWTH 89, 92 (Adam Jolly ed., 2003).
171. Famous examples include the Bell Laboratory Record, IBM Technical Disclosure
Bulletin, Siemens Zeitschrift, and Xerox Disclosure Journal. Adams & Henson-Apollonio,
supra note 169, at 5. The companies often distribute the journals to the PTO and commercial
databases. Id.; Baker & Mezzetti, supra note 166, at 174.
172. The two most popular sites are IP.com and Research Disclosure. IP.com notes that
over sixty companies disclose information in its prior art database, including Abbott
Laboratories, BASF, Clorox, Dow Chemical, Eastman Kodak, General Electric, IBM, Polaroid,
Samsonite, Siemens, Sony Electronics, and Teva Pharmaceutics. See Our Clients and
Affiliates, IP.COM, http://ip.com/about/clients.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2012). Research
Disclosure asserts that “[90 percent] of the world’s leading companies” have used its services.
See RESEARCH DISCLOSURE, http://www.researchdisclosure.com (last visited Mar. 28, 2012).
In addition to their online content, each service also prints a paper journal.
173. See supra notes 43-51, 74-77; infra note 312 and accompanying text.
174. This could be a published patent application, an issued patent, or a statutory inven-
tion registration (SIR). See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
175. See Adams & Henson-Apollonio, supra note 169, at 7 tbl.1 (comparing the various
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defensively disclose is strengthened when the publication venue is
cheap, easy to produce, timely, and easy for the PTO examiner to
find during a prior art search.176 Because the null patent is the only
venue that satisfies all four criteria, it could easily become the
preferred medium for defensive publication.177
III. USING THE LIBERATED KNOWLEDGE 
A. The (Often Overlooked) Role of Failure in Patent Law
The substantive standards of patentability rely heavily on the
knowledge and abilities of the person having ordinary skill in the
art (PHOSITA)—a hypothetical construct of patent law akin to the
reasonably prudent person in torts.178 Determining the PHOSITA’s
precise identity in a particular technical field depends on the avail-
defensive publication mechanisms); see also Poynder, supra note 169 (explaining that “[i]t
costs $109 ... per document to publish on IP.com” which “compares very favourably with the
$20,000 it costs per patent application to file in key locations worldwide” (quoting Tom Colson
of IP.com)). Another consideration is whether the cost of defensive publication is cheaper than
potential litigation. HANSEN & VANFLEET, supra note 166, at 24 (“[T]he costs (both personal
and financial) of making a defensive disclosure need to be weighed against the cost of not
making that disclosure, specifically the costs of challenging a patent that would not have been
granted had the disclosure been made.” (citation omitted)).
176. Cf. Adams & Henson-Apollonio, supra note 169, at 3-8 (listing the factors to consider
when choosing a mechanism for defensive publication, including accessibility, timeliness, and
cost). 
177. Given that null patents by definition would not satisfy the enablement requirement
of § 112 paragraph 1 (discussed infra Part III.A.3), their principal role for defensive purposes
would be to show a lack of nonobviousness—the greatest hurdle to obtaining a patent. See
infra Part III.A.2. One might ask if a null patent could be used against the null patentee who
later seeks a traditional patent covering the subject matter because the failure was overcome.
It is true, for example, that an inventor’s own prior disclosure can be used as prior art against
him or her if it renders the subsequently claimed invention obvious. See 2 CHISUM, supra note
11, § 5.03[f] (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 19-26 (1966) (relying on one of
Graham’s earlier patents to determine that the patent-at-issue was invalid for a lack of
nonobviousness)); see also MIT v. AB Fortia, 774 F.2d 1104, 1108-09 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(providing an additional example). To allay this concern, Congress could carve out a statutory
exception making the inventor’s own work disclosed in a null patent unavailable as prior art. 
178. See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(explaining that a PHOSITA is “not unlike the ‘reasonable man’ and other ghosts in the law”).
Factors relevant to constructing the PHOSITA in a particular technical field include “(1) the
educational level of the inventor; (2) type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior art
solutions to those problems; (4) rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) sophistication
of the technology; and (6) educational level of active workers in the field.” Envtl. Designs, Ltd.
v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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able knowledge in that field at a specific moment in time. Given that
negative results can potentially contribute to this available know-
ledge, they can alter the PHOSITA’s identity and therefore play a
large role in assessing patentability. 
1. Novelty: A Patent-Obtaining Role
Perhaps counterintuitively, an applicant can point to evidence of
experimental failure to establish novelty. Recall that the purpose of
the novelty requirement is to deny a patent for an invention that
claims subject matter that has been identically disclosed in the prior
art.179 But if a patentee faced with a novelty rejection can show that
the prior art reference, a document asserted against the invention
that the applicant seeks to patent,180 discloses a failed experiment,
that reference no longer qualifies as novelty-defeating prior art and
the rejection disappears. In other words, an applicant can point to
past experimental failure as evidence of patentability—at least for
the purposes of novelty.181 This issue is particularly important in the
chemical and pharmaceutical arts, where a single novel compound
can generate billions of dollars in annual revenue.182 
a. The Basic Test 
Determining novelty requires a comparison of the claimed in-
vention with prior art references, typically documents like issued
patents and printed publications.183 To qualify as novelty-defeating
prior art, a reference must satisfy three conditions.184 First, it must
predate the applicant’s invention or have existed more than one
year before the applicant’s filing date.185 Second, the strict identity
179. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
180. See HERBERT W. SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 18 (3d ed. 2001).
181. But the applicant may face an obviousness problem. See infra Part III.A.2.
182. See Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent Law, 60 DUKE L.J. 919, 927 & n.41
(2011) (discussing patented blockbuster drugs like Lipitor, “the best-selling drug of all time[,]
which generated over $13.6 billion in revenue for Pfizer in 2006”).
183. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
184. Prior art is also used to determine if an invention is obvious. See infra Part III.A.2.
185. Prior art provisions fall into two main categories: (1) the novelty provisions of § 102(a),
(e), and (g), which depend on the invention date; and (2) the loss-of-right provisions of § 102(b),
which depend on the applicant’s filing date. See 2 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS
§ 8:1 (4th ed. 2010) (explaining § 102 of the Patent Act).
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requirement mandates that each and every element186 of the
claimed invention be identically disclosed within the four corners of
a single prior art reference.187 Third, and particularly important for
present purposes, the reference must be enabling.188 This means
that the reference must disclose the subject matter in sufficient
detail to enable a PHOSITA to make it without undue experimenta-
tion,189 a fact-intensive inquiry that depends on interrelated tech-
nical issues such as the presence or absence of working examples in
the reference, the PHOSITA’s knowledge at the time of the refer-
ence, and the nature of the technology.190 If a reference meets all
three criteria, it “anticipates” the claim191 and renders it unpatent-
able.192
b. Experimental Failure and Indirect Enrichment of the
Public Domain
To illustrate the role of experimental failure in the novelty
context, consider an inventor who seeks a patent on a promising
compound, X. The invention enjoys a presumption of novelty,193
meaning that the examiner has both the initial burden of coming
186. A patent claim must define “the subject matter which the applicant regards as his
invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 2 (2006). A claim element further limits the breadth of the
claim. 1 CHISUM, supra note 11, at Gl-3. For an illustration, see infra note 187. 
187. See Trintec Indus., Inc. v. Top-U.S.A. Corp., 295 F.3d 1292, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see
also Structural Rubber Prods. Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(explaining that another reference or knowledge in the art cannot supply missing elements).
So, for example, if an applicant seeks to claim a hammer with a titanium head and an oak
handle—the claim elements—the reference must also disclose a hammer with a titanium head
and an oak handle. 
188. See Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 457 F.3d 1293, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(“In order to anticipate, a prior art reference must not only disclose all of the limitations of the
claimed invention, but also be enabled.”).
189. See Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharm., Inc., 545 F.3d 1312, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
190. See id. at 1314-15 (discussing the factors set forth in In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737
(Fed. Cir. 1988)).
191. See W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1983),
aff’d and rev’d on other grounds, 842 F.2d 1275 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
192. See Akzo N.V. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 808 F.2d 1471, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(explaining that when a claim is anticipated, the public already possesses the subject matter).
193. See In re Wilder, 429 F.2d 447, 450 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (quoting and adding emphasis to
35 U.S.C. § 102, which states that “a person shall be entitled to a patent unless [one of the
statutory exclusions is shown]”). 
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forward with evidence of anticipation194 and the ultimate burden of
proving it.195 Suppose the examiner finds an expired patent that
discloses X, by name or structure, but does not explain how to make
it. Because the first two parts of the anticipation test are met, the
only question is whether the prior art reference is enabling. Though
it might appear that the applicant has the upper hand, the pre-
sumption of novelty is tempered by a presumption of enablement
that attaches to all of the subject matter disclosed in a prior art
patent.196 To move forward, the burden immediately shifts to the
applicant to prove that the reference is nonenabling, meaning that
a PHOSITA could not have made X without undue experimen-
tation.197 If the applicant cannot do this, X is unpatentable for a lack
of novelty.198 
This is when experimental failure enters the picture. Fortunately
for the applicant, it is well settled that if the asserted reference
discloses a failed experiment, that reference is per se nonenabled
and unavailable as novelty-defeating prior art.199 Absent other
grounds for unpatentability, the application proceeds to patent
issuance.200
194. See id.; see also In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (describing the
examiner’s initial burden of putting forth a prima facie case of unpatentability).
195. See In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1016 (C.C.P.A. 1967); see also In re Epstein, 32 F.3d
1559, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Plager, J., concurring) (articulating the rule that the PTO carries
the burden of persuasion in showing why an applicant should not receive a patent).
196. See Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1355 & n.21 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (explaining the framework and its roots in policy).
197. See id. (citing In re Sasse, 629 F.2d 675, 681 (C.C.P.A. 1980)).
198. See In re Wilder, 429 F.2d at 450-52 (outlining the burden-shifting process for the
anticipatory-enablement inquiry); see also In re Jacobs, 318 F.2d 743, 745 (C.C.P.A. 1963)
(stating that the appellants could prevail only if they carried the burden of proof).
199. See In re Wiggins, 488 F.2d 538, 542-43 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (noting that although the
reference described X by name, its failed synthesis, plus the lack of evidence that a PHOSITA
could make it at that time, made the reference nonenabling); In re Sheppard, 339 F.2d 238,
241 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (explaining that a compound’s decomposition during synthesis created
uncertainty about the reference’s teaching and thus made the discosure nonenabling); accord
In re Donohue, 766 F.2d 531, 533 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (explaining that a failed experiment is
“strong evidence” that a reference is nonenabling); Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 755
F.2d 1549, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting that a failed experiment reported in a third-party
patent makes it irrelevant as a prior art reference). By contrast, a reference that is silent
about experimental details still qualifies as prior art. In re Donohue, 766 F.2d at 533 (“[T]he
fact that the author of a [prior art reference] did not attempt to make his disclosed invention
does not indicate one way or the other whether the publication would have been enabling.”).
200. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Paul R. Michel, The Challenge
Ahead: Increasing Predictability in Federal Circuit Jurisprudence for the New Century, 43 AM.
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This outcome is congruent with core objectives of the patent
system. Consider what would happen if prior experimental failure
could foreclose patentability: X might never enter the innovation
cycle.201 Because the asserted reference does not enable X, its
disclosure provides the PHOSITA and the public with no substan-
tive technical information about the compound.202 If the PTO denies
a patent to one who can actually make and use X, it not only
deprives that inventor of a potential opportunity to reap an
economic benefit from the compound but also deprives the patent
system of an opportunity to obtain a technically robust disclosure
that actually enables X.203 And because it is unlikely that X will be
disclosed in a medium other than a patent document,204 the public
may never get possession of the compound.205
Rendering X patentable, on the other hand, has the opposite
effect. First, the inventor can exploit the compound, thereby pro-
viding a reward for the inventive effort and encouraging further
creative activity.206 Second, X’s disclosure adds to the public store-
U. L. REV. 1231, 1249 (1994) (“If the claimed invention is patentable, the applicant is entitled
to a patent (because [§ 102 of] the statute says so)—not eventually, but as soon as
patentability can be determined.”).
201. Innovation is a three-stage cycle that brings inventions into widespread, practical use
by “feed[ing] on the known and convert[ing] it into the new.” GOLLIN, supra note 3, at 11.
After individuals first engage in creative labor using existing knowledge, the product of that
labor is then distributed among and adopted by society, ultimately adding to the pool of
accessible knowledge for other creative individuals to use and improve on. See id. at 15-19.
202. It is possible that the PHOSITA may have sufficient knowledge to make X though the
disclosed method of making it failed. Seymore, supra note 182, at 956-57. But this becomes
less likely as the subject matter becomes more complex.
203. Rejecting a claim to X will essentially foreclose the opportunity to fully exploit the
compound. Cf. Nuno Pires de Carvalho, The Problem of Gene Patents, 3 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD.
L. REV. 701, 735 (2004) (arguing that inventions that are never exploited, and thus never
reach the market, are economically irrelevant). In addition, if the subsequent inventor
abandons the patent application, the public will not gain access to the presumably enabling
technical information disclosed therein. It is also unlikely that the subsequent inventor will
disclose the information in another medium. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
205. See GOLLIN, supra note 3, at 18 (“[The cycle] stops when creative people lack access
to information, ... when innovations are lost, and when law and circumstances make
innovations inaccessible.”).
206. Patent law “seeks to foster and reward invention” with the hope that the disclosure
will “stimulate further innovation and ... permit the public to practice the invention once the
patent expires.” Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979). But “[e]ven if no
incentive is required to produce an innovation, providing a reward after the creative act
encourages [the inventor] and others to do more creative work in the future.” GOLLIN, supra
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house of knowledge for others to use. In particular, assuming that
the patent application complies with the disclosure requirements of
the patent statute,207 the public gets robust technical information
about the compound once the application publishes or the patent
issues.208 Together, these effects promote innovation and other goals
of the patent system.
2. Nonobviousness: A (Predominantly) Patent-Defeating Role
Experimental failure in the nonobviousness context functions
quite differently vis-à-vis its role in novelty. Most importantly, a
reference disclosing experimental failure qualifies as patent-de-
feating prior art for the purpose of determining nonobviousness.209
Funneling more of these disclosures into the public domain would
thus greatly expand the universe of such prior art. Given that a lack
of nonobviousness is the most significant barrier to patentability,210
this expansion could render a very large number of inventions
unpatentable—or issued patents invalid, as the case may be.211 
note 3, at 38.
207. See infra note 253 (discussing 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 1 (2006)).
208. See Seymore, supra note 4, at 627 (arguing that the teaching function should be an
important goal of the patent system).
209. See infra notes 222-23.
210. See generally NONOBVIOUSNESS—THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY (John
F. Witherspoon ed., 1980) (compiling papers celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of
codification of the nonobviousness doctrine as 35 U.S.C. § 103); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent
Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV.
1, 19 (2004) (noting that “nonobviousness has traditionally represented the principal
substantive hurdle for patentability” due to the scope and flexible nature of the inquiry). The
barrier is now higher than before following a recent Supreme Court decision. See KSR Int’l
Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s rigid test for
nonobviousness due to its inconsistency with the “expansive and flexible approach” set forth
in Supreme Court precedent). Nonobviousness is the most common issue raised on appeal in
patent cases. See Dennis D. Crouch, Understanding the Role of the Board of Patent Appeals:
Ex Parte Rejection Rates on Appeal 10 (Univ. of Mo. Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 2009-16, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1423922 (finding that 87-90
percent of cases decided a nonobviousness issue). See also infra note 211.
211. Note that nonobviousness is the most commonly litigated patent validity issue and the
one most likely to result in patent invalidation. Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious:
Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67
OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 1398 & n.17 (2006) (collecting empirical sources). For a scenario in which
experimental failure can be used to establish nonobviousness, see infra note 237 and
accompanying text.
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a. The Nonobviousness Standard 
The nonobviousness requirement, embodied in § 103(a) of the
Patent Act,212 denies patents for trivial extensions of what is already
in the public domain.213 It does not target inventions that are
identically disclosed in the prior art,214 but rather those that are
sufficiently close to the prior art and within the PHOSITA’s
technical grasp at the time the claimed invention is made.215 Thus,
nonobviousness “creates a ‘patent-free’ zone around the state of the
art,”216 allowing the PHOSITA to substitute materials, streamline
processes, and “[make] the usual marginal improvements which
occur as a technology matures.”217
In Graham v. John Deere Co., the Supreme Court articulated the
basic framework for determining nonobviousness.218 It is a question
of law based on the following pertinent underlying facts: (1) the
scope and content of the relevant prior art; (2) the differences be-
tween the prior art and the claimed invention; (3) the PHOSITA’s
level of skill; and (4) secondary considerations that provide objective
proof of nonobviousness, such as showing that the invention fulfilled
a long-felt but unsolved need.219 Subsequent case law has estab-
lished that a conclusion of obviousness must be supported by clearly
articulated reasoning.220
212. The statute provides in relevant part that
[a] patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed
or described as set forth in Section 102 ... if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter
as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
[PHOSITA] to which said subject matter pertains.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
213. See John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation, 86 TEX. L.
REV. 1, 6-7 (2007) (exploring the wisdom of denying patents for trivial inventions); supra notes
11-12 and accompanying text.
214. The novelty requirement performs this function. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
215. See § 103(a); CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 305 (2d ed. 2010); cf. In re
Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Rader, J., dissenting) (“The proper tool for
assessing sufficient contribution to the useful arts is the obviousness requirement of 35 U.S.C.
§ 103.”).
216. MARTIN J. ADELMAN, RANDALL R. RADER & JOHN R. THOMAS, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON PATENT LAW 288 (3d ed. 2009).
217. Id.
218. 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
219. Id. at 17-18.
220. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (explaining that in addition to
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b. Experimental Failure: Indirect Protection of the Public
Domain
The framework presented above reveals that the scope of the
nonobviousness inquiry is much broader than the one for novelty.
Two differences are worth highlighting. First, because nonobvi-
ousness does not target identically disclosed inventions, the inquiry
extends beyond that of a single reference and contemplates that the
PHOSITA will combine and modify the teachings of multiple ref-
erences.221 Second, the prior art for nonobviousness as a whole must
be enabling—not merely any single reference.222 Thus, a reference
disclosing a failed experiment “is prior art for all that it teaches”
because a PHOSITA can possibly extract something from it.223 This
explains why such references can play a powerful role in defeating
patentability.
To illustrate, consider the following hypothetical. Suppose that in
2007 an inventor develops a five-bladed aircraft propeller made with
carbon fiber-reinforced plastic (CFRP), a composite material.224 The
the Graham factors, “[r]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere
conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational
underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness” (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d
977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006))); see also MPEP, supra note 116, § 2141(III) (listing rationales that
examiners can use to support a conclusion of obviousness).
221. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006); see also Cohesive Techs., Inc. v. Waters Corp., 543 F.3d
1351, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Obviousness can be proven by combining existing prior art
references, while anticipation requires all elements of a claim to be disclosed within a single
reference.”).
222. Therasense v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1289, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“In order
to render a claimed [invention] obvious, the cited prior art as a whole must enable [the
PHOSITA] to make and use [it].”); Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Opticon, Inc., 935 F.2d 1569, 1578
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (“While a reference must enable someone to practice the invention in order
to anticipate[,] a non-enabling reference may qualify as prior art for the purpose of
determining obviousness under § 103.”); see also In re Kumar, 418 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (“Although published subject matter is ‘prior art’ for all that it discloses, in order to
render an invention unpatentable for obviousness, the prior art must enable a [PHOSITA] to
make and use the invention.”).
223. Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. LKB Produkter AB, 892 F.2d 1547, 1551 (Fed. Cir.
1989); accord Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1357 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (“Under § 103, ... a reference need not be enabled; it qualifies as a prior art, regardless,
for whatever is disclosed therein.”).
224. A composite material is a “multiphase material[ ] obtained [by] artificial combination
of different materials[, so as] to attain properties that the individual components by
themselves cannot attain.” DEBORAH D.L. CHUNG, COMPOSITE MATERIALS: SCIENCE AND
APPLICATIONS 1 (2d ed. 2010). CFRP is a lightweight composite made by embedding carbon
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inventor files a patent application later that year claiming the
device. Though five-bladed propellers abound in the prior art, the
claimed device is novel because it is not identically disclosed
therein. Turning to nonobviousness, the examiner finds two prior
art references from the same field of endeavor225 that teach all of the
limitations of the claimed device: a patent issued in 1975 disclosing
a five-bladed plastic propeller and a 1990 article in Aviation
Technology describing the research and development of a six-bladed
CFRP propeller. The latter reference reveals, however, that the
propeller never worked because a stress fracture produced by
imperfect CFRP annealing226 caused it to fail when mounted on an
airplane and spun to operational speed. But an additional ref-
erence,227 a popular composite materials textbook published in 2000,
reveals that CFRP annealing technology had advanced so much
between 1990 and 2000 that stress fractures are no longer observed.
Given this state of the art, the examiner concludes that the prior art
would have enabled a PHOSITA to produce the claimed device at
the time it was made.228 
From all this, the examiner concludes that it would have been
obvious for a PHOSITA at the time of the invention to combine the
teachings of the prior art to produce the claimed device. To support
this conclusion, the examiner explains that a PHOSITA could have
applied contemporary CFRP annealing technology to the teachings
of the 1990 article and combined them with the teachings of the
fibers, which provide strength and stiffness, into plastic, which acts as a binder. Id.
225. A reference qualifies as § 103(a) prior art if it is analogous to the field of invention. See
In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 986-87 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S.
1, 35 (1966)). References drawn from the same field of endeavor are considered analogous. See
id. at 987.
226. Annealing is a process that removes the stress developed in a material during its
fabrication. 2 PLASTICS ENGINEERING, MANUFACTURING, AND DATA HANDBOOK 1397 (Dominick
V. Rosato et al. eds., 2001). The process involves heating the material to a certain temper-
ature, holding the material at that temperature for a certain period of time, and cooling it at
a controlled slow rate. Id. 
227. Note that “[p]rior art is not limited just to the references being applied, but includes
the understanding of one of ordinary skill in the art.” MPEP, supra note 116, § 2141.
228. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
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1975 patent in a predictable manner229 to produce the claimed
device with a reasonable expectation of success.230 
Having made a prima facie case of obviousness,231 the burden of
going forward shifts to the applicant.232 Unable to prove that the
prior art is nonenabling,233 the applicant attempts to rebut the
prima facie case by arguing that the claimed device satisfies a long-
felt but unresolved need in the art.234 The examiner responds with
a request for actual proof235: specifically, “objective evidence that an
art recognized problem existed in the art for a long period of time
without solution.”236 If the applicant could show, for example, that
others had tried to make the identical invention but failed, such
evidence could be probative of nonobviousness.237 But absent such
229. See MPEP, supra note 116, § 2143(A) (noting that combining references according to
known methods to produce a predictable result is an appropriate rationale to support a
conclusion of obviousness); cf. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007)
(explaining that a combination of elements “must do more than yield a predictable result”).
230. See In re PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. ViaCell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342, 1360, 1364
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (reaffirming “reasonable expectation of success” jurisprudence post-KSR); In
re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903-04 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Obviousness does not require absolute
predictability.... [A]ll that is required is a reasonable expectation of success.” (citations
omitted)).
231. The examiner has the initial burden of setting forth a prima facie case of
unpatentability. See In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (interpreting Graham
v. John Deere Co. to require the PTO to provide a factual basis for a § 103 rejection); cases
cited supra notes 193-94.
232. In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d at 1472.
233. Once the examiner has made a prima facie case of obviousness, the burden shifts to
the applicant to prove that the asserted prior art is nonenabling. MPEP, supra note 116,
§ 2145 (citing In re Hoeksema, 399 F.2d 269, 274-75 (C.C.P.A. 1968)).
234. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
235. During the course of patent examination, the examiner may request “[t]echnical
information known to [the] applicant concerning ... the disclosure, the claimed subject matter,
other factual information pertinent to patentability, or concerning the accuracy of the
examiner’s stated interpretation of such item.” 37 C.F.R. § 1.105 (a)(1)(viii) (2009).
236. MPEP, supra note 116, § 716.04. In addition, “significant improvements in the art that
bear on the inventor’s solution dilute the significance of prior need and failures.” 2 CHISUM,
supra note 11, § 5.05[1]b.
237. One potential argument is the “failure of others.” See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383
U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966) (recognizing “failure of others” as a secondary consideration); Advanced
Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (explaining that
“failure [of] others” may be “the most probative and cogent evidence of nonobviousness”
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The rationale is that the claimed
invention is not a mere trivial advance over the prior art if many have tried to solve the
problem but failed. Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 320 F.3d
1339, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“While absolute certainty is not necessary to establish a
reasonable expectation of success, there can be little better evidence negating an expectation
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a showing, “the mere passage of time without the claimed invention
is not evidence of nonobviousness.”238 Lacking the requisite evi-
dence, the applicant decides to abandon the application.
Derailing patentability in this context makes sense from a
technical standpoint and aligns with core goals of the patent system.
Combining known materials—a five-bladed propeller and CFRP—to
produce a predictable, trivial modification—a five-bladed CFRP
propeller—draws on knowledge already in the public domain and
well within the PHOSITA’s skill and ordinary creativity.239 By
of success than actual reports of failure.” (citation omitted)); In re Dow Chemical Co., 837 F.2d
469, 472 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“Recognition of need, and difficulties encountered by those skilled
in the field, are classical indicia of unobviousness.”). The relevance of the failure of others in
rebutting a prima facie case of obviousness depends on several factors. First, others must
have failed to make the precisely claimed invention—not at the general concept. See Sjolund
v. Musland, 847 F.2d 1573, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Second, the need must have been persistent.
In re Gershon, 372 F.2d 535, 538 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (“Since the alleged problem in this case was
first recognized by appellants, and others apparently have not yet become aware of its
existence, it goes without saying that there could not possibly be any evidence of either a long
felt need in the ... art for a solution to a problem of dubious existence or failure of others
skilled in the art who unsuccessfully attempted to solve a problem of which they were not
aware.”). Third, the failure must be attributable to a lack of technical know-how rather than
to the PHOSITA’s lack of interest. Scully Signal Co. v. Elecs. Corp. of Am., 570 F.2d 355, 361
(1st Cir. 1977). Fourth, the claimed invention must actually satisfy the long-felt need. W.L.
Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting that
commercial success of the invention can show that it satisfied the long-felt need); In re
Cavanagh, 436 F.2d 491, 496 (C.C.P.A. 1971). An alternative argument is that the failed
experiment disclosed in the asserted prior art “teaches away” from the claimed invention. See
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007) (recognizing “teaching away” as a
viable rebuttal argument for establishing nonobviousness) (citing United States v. Adams, 383
U.S. 39, 51-52 (1966)). A prior art reference teaches away “when a [PHOSITA], upon reading
the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would
be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” In re Gurley,
27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Stated another way, “a reference will teach away if it
suggests that the line of development flowing from the reference’s disclosure is unlikely to be
productive of the result sought by the applicant.” Id.; see also In re Icon Health & Fitness, Inc.,
496 F.3d 1374, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (reaffirming Gurley post-KSR). 
238. In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 990 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Iron Grip Barbell Co. v. USA
Sports, Inc., 392 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
239. Cf. KSR, 550 U.S. at 421, 427 (noting that the claimed design step was “well within
the grasp” of a PHOSITA—a person of “ordinary creativity”); see also Anderson’s-Black Rock,
Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 60-63 (1969) (explaining that an invention derived
from old elements that does no more than expected is obvious, despite being new and useful).
Professor Peter Yu elaborates:
When [a PHOSITA] encounters a new problem, he or she will create a new
ordinary invention—an obvious invention—as a matter of course. We do not
need to provide a reward to draw into existence the obvious inventions that fall
within the [PHOSITA’s] skill. The need to solve practical problems is sufficient
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constitutional command, a patent can neither remove such knowl-
edge from the public domain nor limit free access to those materials
already available.240 Rather, a patent can be awarded only for tech-
nical advances that add to the storehouse of useful knowledge.241 As
the Supreme Court recently explained:
We build and create by bringing to the tangible and palpable
reality around us new works based on instinct, simple logic,
ordinary inferences, extraordinary ideas, and sometimes even
genius. These advances, once part of our shared knowledge,
define a new threshold from which innovation starts once more.
And as progress beginning from higher levels of achievement is
expected in the normal course, the results of ordinary innovation
are not the subject of exclusive rights under the patent laws.
Were it otherwise patents might stifle, rather than promote, the
progress of useful arts.242
Thus, the nonobviousness requirement denies patents for inventions
that would arise through ordinary technological progress243 and, as
to spark [their development], and their suitability for the needs they satisfy is
itself a sufficient reward.
YU, supra note 11, at 2.
240. Graham, 383 U.S. at 6; see also Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the
Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 283 (1977) (arguing that patents should not be granted
for the use and development of known technical information because “proper incentives for
its acquisition and use exist without a property right”). 
241. Graham, 383 U.S. at 6 (“Innovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum
of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system which by constitutional
command must ‘promote the Progress of ... useful Arts.’”); cf. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v.
Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152 (1950) (“The conjunction or concert of known
elements must contribute something; only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of
its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable.”).
242. KSR, 550 U.S. at 427; cf. Edmund W. Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co.: New
Standards for Patents, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 293, 301 (explaining that nonobviousness is based
on the principle that “a patent should not be granted for an innovation unless [it] would have
been unlikely to have been developed absent the prospect of a patent”).
243. See YU, supra note 11, at 2 (“It is socially wasteful for us to pay a patent-backed
premium for an innovation that we are almost certain to receive for free and just as early.”);
Michael J. Meurer & Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent Carrots and Sticks: A Model of
Nonobviousness, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 547, 549 (2008) (“The nonobviousness threshold
may be used as a ‘stick’ to induce researchers to pursue more difficult, socially preferred
research projects.”); supra text accompanying notes 216 and 242.
2012] THE NULL PATENT 2087
a corollary, seeks to “weed[ ] out those inventions [that] would not
be disclosed or devised but for the inducement of a patent.”244
This last point is important in understanding why the teachings
from failed experiments are available as prior art for nonobvi-
ousness. Recall that prior art must be enabling,245 meaning that the
PHOSITA could combine the art’s teachings with his or her own
knowledge and skill to make the claimed invention.246 For novelty,
these teachings must come from a single reference.247 If that single
reference discloses a failed experiment, there is a danger that the
PHOSITA could not—relying solely on knowledge and skill in the
art—fill in the technical gaps omitted from the disclosure to make
the invention. This is particularly problematic in unpredictable
fields in which the PHOSITA needs more guidance.248 In sum,
denying a patent runs the risk of the enabled invention never being
disclosed.249
The story is quite different for nonobviousness. Given that it is a
flexible standard that can be proven by combining multiple prior art
references, enablement need not depend upon a single one.250
Indeed, nonobviousness contemplates that references can and do
vary widely in the teachings that they provide to the PHOSITA,
244. Graham, 383 U.S. at 11.
245. See supra notes 188 and 222 and accompanying text.
246. See In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“[A] prior art reference must
be considered together with the knowledge of [the PHOSITA].” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929, 939 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (explaining that the proper test
is whether the PHOSITA “could take the description of the invention in the [reference] and
combine it with his own knowledge of the particular art and from this combination be put in
possession of the invention on which a patent is sought”).
247. See Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1577 (Fed.
Cir. 1991) (“If it is necessary to reach beyond the boundaries of a single reference to provide
missing disclosure of the claimed invention, the proper ground is not § 102 anticipation, but
§ 103 obviousness.”); supra note 187 and accompanying text.
248. The courts refer to chemistry, biotechnology, and related experimental fields as
“unpredictable” because PHOSITAs in these fields often cannot predict whether a reaction
protocol that works for one embodiment will work for others. See, e.g., Cedarapids, Inc. v.
Nordberg, Inc., No. 95-1529, 1997 WL 452801, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 11, 1997) (explaining that
in the chemical arts, “a slight variation ... can yield an unpredictable result or may not work
at all”). On the other hand, applied technologies like electrical and mechanical engineering
are often regarded as “predictable” arts because they are rooted in well-defined, predictable
factors. See, e.g., In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
249. See supra text accompanying notes 201-05.
250. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
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which is why the prior art as a whole must be enabling.251 So if one
reference discloses a failed experiment, it is reasonable to expect
that the PHOSITA could rely on the other references in addition to
knowledge and skill in the art to fill in the technical gaps to make
the invention.252
3. Enablement: A Patent-Obtaining or Patent-Defeating Role
The two previous Subsections explored the role of experimental
failure in novelty and nonobviousness—the prior art provisions of
the patent statute. Again, those provisions protect the integrity of
preexisting knowledge in the public domain. This Subsection ex-
plores the importance of references disclosing experimental failure
in gauging compliance with another patentability hurdle: the
enablement requirement of § 112 paragraph 1.253 By compelling an
applicant to provide a disclosure that enables a PHOSITA to prac-
tice the full scope of the claimed invention, it ensures that public
knowledge is enriched in exchange for the right to exclude.254
251. See supra notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
252. See, e.g., Purdue Pharma Prods. L.P. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 377 F. App’x 978, 982-83
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (explaining in the § 103(a) context, though one reference was nonenabled, the
PHOSITA could have achieved the claimed invention through routine experimentation). But
if the PHOSITA cannot make the invention, the reference cannot support a determination of
nonobviousness. See Seymore, supra note 182, at 939 n.104 (collecting cases).
253. Enablement is one of the three disclosure requirements appearing in the first
paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with
which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth
the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 1 (2006) (emphasis added). 
254. Nat’l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1195-96
(Fed. Cir. 1999); see also Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722,
736 (2002) (“[P]atent rights are given in exchange for disclosing the invention to the public.”);
Donald S. Chisum, Comment: Anticipation, Enablement and Obviousness: An Eternal Golden
Braid, 15 AIPLA Q.J. 57, 59 (1987) (arguing that disclosure is “a primary purpose” of the
enablement requirement).
2012] THE NULL PATENT 2089
a. Statutory Enablement 
Enablement questions typically arise in two contexts in patent
law. Thus far, the discussion has focused on the form pertaining to
prior art references.255 This judicially imposed requirement for prior
art256 is referred to as “patent-defeating” enablement because it is
used to demonstrate that a PHOSITA could use preexisting know-
ledge to make the invention.257 Its statutory cousin, appearing in
§ 112 paragraph 1 of the Patent Act, compels a patent applicant to
submit a written description258 that enables a PHOSITA to make
and use the full scope of the claimed invention at the time of filing259
without undue experimentation.260 Aside from policing claim
scope,261 it ensures that the applicant’s disclosure will enrich public
255. See discussion supra Part III.A.1-2.
256. See In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929, 939 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (discussing the requirement and
the underlying rationale).
257. See 1 CHISUM, supra note 11, § 3.04; F. SCOTT KIEFF, PAULINE NEWMAN, HERBERT F.
SCHWARTZ & HENRY E. SMITH, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 412 (4th ed. 2008).
258. The written description is the part of the patent or patent application that completely
describes the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112. It is often used interchangeably, and mistakenly,
with the term specification. KIEFF ET AL., supra note 257, at 73 n.6. 
259. In re Glass, 492 F.2d 1228, 1232 (C.C.P.A. 1974); accord In re Enzo Biochem, Inc. v.
Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1371-72 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (explaining that in both patent
examination and litigation the enablement determination “is made retrospectively, i.e., by
looking back to the filing date of the patent application and determining whether undue
experimentation would have been required to make and use the claimed invention at that
time”); In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 607 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (reaffirming rule).
260. Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing AK Steel Corp.
v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1238-39 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). Although the term “undue
experimentation” does not appear in the statute, “it is well established that enablement
requires that the [written description] teach those in the art to make and use the invention
without undue experimentation.” In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Other
differences between the two forms of enablement, not particularly important for present
purposes, have been discussed elsewhere. See, e.g., Janice M. Mueller & Donald S. Chisum,
Enabling Patent Law’s Inherent Anticipation Doctrine, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1101, 1137-38 (2008);
Seymore, supra note 182, at 932-33.
261. Claim scope must “be less than or equal to the scope of the enablement.” Nat’l
Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
The scope of enablement “is that which is disclosed in the [written description] plus the scope
of what would be known to [a PHOSITA] without undue experimentation.” Id.; see also
Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law’s Possession Paradox, 23 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 1, 9-10 (2009) (explaining in detail the relationship between enablement and claim
scope).
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knowledge262 and that the public will get complete possession of the
invention once the patent expires.263
Gauging compliance with the enablement requirement is easiest
when the applicant actually makes the invention and discloses the
technical details in the patent application.264 But unlike the rules of
mainstream science, which “require actual performance of every
experimental detail” as a prerequisite for publication,265 in patent
law an inventor needs to provide only sufficient technical informa-
tion to teach a PHOSITA how to practice the invention without
undue experimentation.266 This means that an applicant usually
does not need to actually reduce an invention to practice or produce
a physical embodiment267 of it to obtain a patent.268 
Inventions disclosed in a patent application, including those not
physically made, enjoy a presumption of enablement.269 This means
262. Nat’l Recovery Techs., 166 F.3d at 1195-96; cf. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416
U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (explaining that when the information disclosed in a patent becomes
publicly available it adds to the “general store of knowledge” and assumedly will stimulate
ideas and promote technological development); In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390, 1394
(C.C.P.A. 1970) (Baldwin, J., concurring) (noting that the full and complete disclosure of how
to make and use the claimed invention “adds a measure of worthwhile knowledge to the public
storehouse”).
263. See Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(“Enablement looks to placing the subject matter of the claims generally in the possession of
the public.”); cf. Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 418 (1822) (“The object is to put the
public in complete possession of the invention ... so that interference with it may be avoided
while the patent continues, and its benefits may be fully enjoyed by the public, after the
patent expires.”).
264. Cf. Seymore, supra note 4, at 652-53 (advocating a working example requirement for
complex technologies that would, among other things, simplify the enablement analysis).
265. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Newman, J., dissenting). 
266. Id.; see also Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 IND.
L.J. 779, 781 (2011) (“[T]he description in a patent need not include information already
known by the PHOSITA, which permits applicants to submit simpler patent disclosures.”).
267. An embodiment is a concrete form of an invention, like a chemical compound or a
widget, described in a patent application or patent. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN
FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 27 (4th ed. 2007).
268. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 60 (1998) (“[T]he word ‘invention’ in the Patent
Act unquestionably refers to the inventor’s conception rather than to a physical embodiment
of that idea.”). Thus, in patent law, an invention can be actually reduced to practice by
physically making it or constructively reduced to practice by filing a patent application that
describes how to make and use it. Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d
1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986). A constructive reduction to practice presumptively satisfies the
disclosure requirements of § 112 paragraph 1. Id. 
269. In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“[A]pplicants should not have been
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that an examiner who doubts enablement must establish a prima
facie case of nonenablement, which he must support with refer-
ences.270 The applicant can rebut the prima facie case with persua-
sive argument or proof.271 The burden of production may continue to
shift as each side presents new evidence;272 however, the examiner
carries the ultimate burden of persuasion with a preponderance of
the evidence as the standard of proof.273
b. Failed Experiments and the Public Storehouse of     
Knowledge
Perhaps counterintuitively, both the applicant and the examiner
can rely on experimental failure to carry their respective evidentiary
burdens when enablement is at issue. For instance, consider a
publication from 2007 describing a two-step process that failed to
successfully convert compound A into compound C. It may be that
step one, which produced intermediate compound B, worked—
meaning that it was actually step two that failed. Note that this
publication would be enabling with regard to B but nonenabling
with regard to C. So either the applicant or examiner could rely on
it as evidence of enablement (B) or nonenablement (C), respectively.
To illustrate the latter, suppose that in 2008 an inventor at a
drug company seeks to patent compound Y. Although Y is not phys-
ically made before filing,274 the inventor posits in the patent
application that a PHOSITA could rely on conventional techniques
required to substantiate their presumptively correct disclosure to avoid a rejection under the
first paragraph of § 112.”); In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 223 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (explaining that
the PTO must accept the applicant’s disclosure “as in compliance with the enabling
requirement of [§ 112 paragraph 1] unless there is reason to doubt the objective truth of the
statements contained therein that must be relied on for enabling support”).
270. In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d at 224; see also In re Brebner, 455 F.2d 1402, 1405 (C.C.P.A.
1972) (holding that the PTO must provide a factual basis for a lack of enablement rejection,
rather than conclusory statements about the PHOSITA’s level of skill).
271. In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
272. When the applicant submits rebuttal evidence, the examiner must “start over” and
“consider all of the evidence anew.” Id. at 1472-73.
273. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also supra note 194. 
274. There are several reasons why inventors seek to obtain patents at an early stage of
research and development. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of
Venture Capital, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 137, 144 (2000) (attracting or appeasing
venture capital); Seymore, supra note 4, at 658 (safeguarding patent rights in the United
States and abroad).
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known in the art to make Y by mixing precursor C with several
well-known chemicals. The examiner rejects the claim as prima
facie nonenabled in light of the 2007 reference discussed above,
which teaches that C cannot be made. In other words, the examiner
reasons that if C cannot be made, then the applicant’s disclosure
must also be nonenabling with respect to Y. Faced with this
evidence, the applicant decides to abandon the application. 
Now consider what would have happened if the disclosure from
the 2007 reference were not in the public domain or was otherwise
inaccessible to the examiner. Absent any other grounds for unpat-
entability, the patent for Y would be granted.275 This result would
clearly frustrate fundamental goals of patent policy, the most
obvious being that the public would get nothing in exchange for the
patent.276 On the other hand, derailing the applicant’s claim to Y
keeps the doors of patentability open for a subsequent inventor
who can actually enable Y and, consequently, enrich the public
storehouse of knowledge with technical information about the
invention.277
B. Benefits of the Proposal
1. It Will Improve Patent Quality
Issues related to patent quality are fueling much of the debate
over patent reform.278 Patent quality can be defined as “the capacity
275. See supra note 199.
276. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (“[T]he patent system represents
a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation and the public disclosure of
new and useful advances in technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited
period of time.”); Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Enabling
the full scope of the claim is part of the quid pro quo of the patent bargain.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 4, at 3-4 (2003) [hereinafter
FTC REPORT], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (noting that
enablement plays the central role in “safeguard[ing] the patent system’s disclosure function
by ensuring relatively swift dissemination of technical information from which others ... can
learn”).
277. See supra notes 261-62 and accompanying text.
278. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 161-63 (2008) (identifying potential
causes of low-quality patents); Patrick Leahy & Orrin Hatch, Op-Ed, Meaningful Patent
Reform, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2008, at A19 (advocating the passage of a patent reform bill
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of a granted patent to meet (or exceed) the statutory standards of
patentability—most importantly, to be novel, nonobvious, and
clearly and sufficiently described.”279 Aside from being technically
invalid,280 patents that fall short of the statutory standards of
patentability are often worthless281 and burdensome to the patent
system.282
Several commentators argue that one of the primary causes of the
quality problem is that examiners lack adequate technical informa-
tion needed to perform a rigorous examination.283 Given that
examiners draw heavily from issued patents and published patent
that would lead to a better patent system that issues high-quality patents); Editorial, Patently
Ridiculous, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2006, at A24 (arguing that improving patent quality will
require action by the PTO, courts, and Congress); Robert C. Pozen, Inventing a Better Patent
System, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2009, at A33 (urging for patent reform because “[t]he quality of
American patents has been deteriorating for years; they are increasingly issued for products
and processes that are not truly innovative”). 
279. R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2135,
2138 (2009). This is a legal definition. From an economic perspective, a high-quality patent
is “one that covers an invention that would not otherwise be made [but for the incentive of a
patent] or one that ensures that a good idea is commercialized.” Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar
Harhoff, Post-Grant Reviews in the U.S. Patent System: Design Choices and Expected Impact,
19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 989, 991 (2004).
280. See Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 763, 765 (2002) (“It is widely suggested that the Patent Office issues patents that
are either ‘facially’ invalid or broader than the actual innovation disclosed in the patent
application.”); cf. FTC REPORT, supra note 276, executive summary, at 5 (“A poor quality or
questionable patent is one that is likely invalid or contains claims that are overly broad.”).
281. See Edmund W. Kitch, Property Rights in Inventions, Writings, and Marks, 13 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 122-23 (1990) (“[M]ost issued patents are worthless, or very nearly
worthless.”); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property
Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 603
(1999) (“[M]ost [patented] technologies will not be economically viable or commercially
successful.”).
282. John R. Thomas, The Responsibility of the Rulemaker: Comparative Approaches to
Patent Administration Reform, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 727, 731 (2002) (noting that one
consequence is the need for legal actors to revisit the work of the PTO to assess patent
validity).
283. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 14, at 139-42; see also Mark A. Lemley, Rational
Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1500 (2001) (“[M]uch of the most
relevant prior art isn’t easy to find—it consists of [third-party activities] that don’t show up
in any searchable database and will not be found by examiners in a hurry.”); Michael Risch,
The Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecution, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 179, 196 (2007) (“A
high-quality prior art search is difficult because of resource and time limitations.”); Thomas,
supra note 113, at 318-19 (explaining that in newer technologies, examiners often cannot
obtain the most recent technical literature).
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applications found in patent databases,284 critics contend that many
searches may not identify other, and perhaps more relevant,
technical information available from nonpatent sources.285 This is
particularly problematic in nascent, rapidly changing, or highly
specialized fields in which there is a paucity of relevant patent
literature.286 In these fields, one would expect to find the most
relevant technical information elsewhere.287 So to the extent that
the examiner skews the search toward patent databases when most
of the relevant technical information is embodied in the nonpatent
literature, that search will lead to the issuance of a patent covering
subject matter that is already in the public domain.288 The likely
result is a low-quality patent.289
The foregoing discussion suggests that, to a large extent, “[t]he
assurance of a good patent quality is all about information.”290
Clearly an examiner must have all of the relevant technical
information in hand in order to accurately gauge patentability. And
certainly, for many inventions, no one believes that patent data-
bases sufficiently represent the body of preexisting knowledge.291
But given their production goals292 and time pressures,293 it is quite
284. See sources cited supra notes 20 and 113. 
285. See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN
SOLVE IT 51 (2009) (explaining that although the PTO’s accessible information sources might
be sufficient to gauge patentability for mechanical and chemical fields, this may not be true
in fields like software, where the relevant information is inaccessible to the PTO); sources
cited supra note 281.
286. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism:
Intellectual Property Implications of “Lock-Out” Programs, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1178-79
(1995) (noting that many developments in computer programming are not documented in
previously issued patents or even scholarly publications); see also Thomas, supra note 113,
at 318-19 (“Overreliance upon patents as indicia of the state of the art works far more
mischief in fields long believed to be outside the patent system [like] ... software ... and other
postindustrial inventions, [where] ... the repository of issued patents insufficiently samples
the prior art.”).
287. See sources cited supra notes 283-84.
288. Thomas, supra note 113, at 318-19.
289. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
290. Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 24
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 748 (2009).
291. See supra notes 283-84 and accompanying text.
292. “Production goals are the number of specific actions and decisions that patent
examiners must make about patent applications they review during a 2-week period.” U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-1102, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE: HIRING
EFFORTS ARE NOT SUFFICIENT TO REDUCE THE PATENT APPLICATION BACKLOG 2 (2007).
Implicit in these goals is an estimate of the time it takes to review a patent application. Cf.
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understandable why examiners rely so heavily on patent databases.
Because patent documents are familiar, readily accessible, conve-
niently classified, and printed in a common standardized format,
turning to nonpatent sources adds time and complexity to the
search.294 Put differently, examiners have little incentive to turn to
nonpatent sources if doing so will compromise throughput.295 
Providing the examiner with more nonpatent technical informa-
tion alone is no guarantee of improved patent examination quality.
Tackling the problem is an issue of substance and form, in that
there is a need for a source of relevant technical information whose
functional attributes resemble that of a patent database. A null
patent database would do just that: it would provide technical
information about failed experiments in a patent-like form. Here it
is worth reemphasizing that such technical information can be
extremely important in determining whether an invention is novel,
nonobvious, and enabled296—patentability criteria that are always
front and center in any discussion of patent quality.297 
The availability of this expanded universe of technical informa-
tion, particularly when combined with other changes at the PTO,298
id. at 5-6 (discussing the discrepancy between ideal production goals and actual time
necessary to achieve them).
293. The amount of time the PTO allots for an examiner to dispose of a case depends on
factors like seniority and the technology involved. See id. at 7. Time estimates vary. Compare
Thomas, supra note 113, at 314 (estimating a sixteen- to seventeen-hour average time
allotment), with Lemley, supra note 283, at 1500 n.19 (aggregating time estimates, which
range from eight to thirty-two hours, depending on the technology). As a part of its internal
patent reform, the PTO has reevaluated examination timelines. See supra Part III.A.
294. See supra note 112.
295. Cf. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 285, at 23 (“[A]n examiner has no incentive to spend
more time on harder cases.”); see also ANTHONY L. MIELE, PATENT STRATEGY: THE MANAGER’S
GUIDE TO PROFITING FROM PATENT PORTFOLIOS 97-98 (2001) (discussing the examiner’s
concerns and incentives); Nikolas J. Uhlir, Note, Throwing a Wrench in the System: Size-
Dependent Properties, Inherency, and Nanotech Patent Applications, 16 FED. CIR. B.J. 327, 340
& nn.88-89 (2008) (explaining the compensation system and the incentives it gives to
examiners); Megan Barnett, Patents Pending, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 10, 2002, at 33,
34 (contending that the work incentives established by the PTO reward “speed, not quality”).
296. See supra Part III.A.
297. See supra text accompanying note 279.
298. See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 2010-2015 STRATEGIC PLAN 9-20 (2010),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/USPTO_2010-2015_Strategic_Plan.pdf
(describing several initiatives that will improve examination timelines and patent quality);
Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Recently Announced Changes to USPTO’s
Examiner Count System Go Into Effect (Feb. 18, 2010), available at http://www.uspto.gov/
news/pr/2010/10_08.jsp (announcing changes to the examiner count system that will give
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would empower the examiner to conduct a more robust exami-
nation of docketed applications and improve the quality of issued
patents.299 This would also affect filing behavior. Whereas a lax
examination regime encourages inventors with low-quality applica-
tions to file,300 a robust regime does the opposite because inventors
“would understand that [low-quality] applications are a waste of
time and money.”301 This would concomitantly reduce the burden on
PTO resources.302 
Improving patent examination quality would reduce uncertainty
throughout the patent system.303 For instance, there would be less
“uncertainty about the validity of granted patents, uncertainty
about the scope of granted patents, uncertainty about whether a
particular invention is patentable, and uncertainty about whether
a valid patent will be fully enforced.”304 Increased certainty would
discourage opportunistic behavior such as rent-seeking patent
acquisition and enforcement activities;305 lower the overall amount,
examiners more time to review applications, rebalance incentives, and improve morale in the
examining corps).
299. See Hall & Harhoff, supra note 279, at 993-94 (describing the interrelationship
between PTO resources, filing frequency, and the examination of individual applications on
patent quality); Craig Allen Nard, Certainty, Fence Building, and the Useful Arts, 74 IND. L.J.
759, 777 (1999) (“If the patentee and PTO had knowledge of invalidating prior art during
prosecution, it is likely that the bargain struck would have produced patent claims of
narrower scope (or a patent may not have issued at all).”).
300. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 14, at 175 (“To put it crudely, if the [PTO] allows bad
patents to issue, this encourages people with bad applications to show up.”).
301. Id.
302. The strain on the PTO’s limited resources contributes to the well-publicized backlog.
See Edward Wyatt, U.S. Sets 21st-Century Goal: Building a Better Patent Office, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 21, 2011, at A1 (providing backlog statistics and attributing the recent surge in
applications to the Internet age). This strain also precludes a thorough review of patent
applications. See Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption
of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 46-47 (2007).
303. One purpose of patent examination is to remove uncertainty. See In re Zletz, 893 F.2d
319, 322 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“An essential purpose of patent examination is to fashion claims
that are precise, clear, correct, and unambiguous. Only in this way can uncertainties of claim
scope be removed, as much as possible, during the administrative process.”).
304. Wagner, supra note 279, at 2140.
305. Thomas, supra note 282, at 731. “Rent-seeking behavior may arise when the holder
of a poor quality patent seeks to enforce exclusionary rights that are probably invalid or seeks
to stretch a valid narrow exclusionary right to cover acts outside the proper scope of the
patent.” Scott R. Boalick, Patent Quality and the Dedication Rule, 11 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 215,
240 (2004) (citing Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive
Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 512-16 (2003)); see also Wagner, supra
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expense, and complexity of patent infringement litigation;306 and
“strengthen the incentives of private actors to engage in value-
maximizing activities such as innovation or commercial transac-
tions.”307
2. It Will Promote Broader Policy Goals of Science and Patent
Law 
Both patent law and science promote technological progress
through the dissemination of knowledge. For instance, in patent law
there is hope that the public will use the technical information
disclosed in a patent document to improve upon the invention,
design around it, or spur more innovation.308 Science contemplates
that researchers will engage in similar activities upon reading a
technical publication.309 Of course, the two differ in their mecha-
nisms of knowledge transfer. Whereas patent law emphasizes the
quick dissemination of technical knowledge to the public,310 in part
because of its indifference to ancillary details like the inventor’s
identity or acumen,311 science insists on filtering knowledge through
note 279, at 2144 (explaining that the uncertainty brought about by a low-quality patent
system allows it “[to] be exploited—whether by filing low-probability, high-cost suits or by
seeking large numbers of low-quality patents to use as leverage for settlement”).
306. Wagner, supra note 279, at 2143-44.
307. Wendy H. Schacht & John R. Thomas, Patent Reform: Innovation Issues, in PATENT
TECHNOLOGY: TRANSFER AND INDUSTRIAL COMPETITION 1, 6 (Juanita M. Branes ed., 2007). 
308. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
309. See Seymore, supra note 4, at 663.
310. The statutory scheme helps achieve this goal. For example, an applicant must file a
patent application within one year of disclosing the invention in a printed publication. 35
U.S.C. § 102(b)(1) (2006). Likewise, if the invention is used in public, sold, or is subject to an
offer for sale in the United States, the applicant must file within one year of the event. Id. A
fundamental purpose of § 102(b) is to encourage prompt filing. Woodland Trust v. Flowertree
Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Similarly, § 102(g) “penaliz[es] the
unexcused delay or failure of a first inventor to share the benefit of the knowledge of [the]
invention with the public after the invention has been completed.” Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v.
U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 54 F.3d 756, 761 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks
omitted). To aid in quick dissemination, most patent applications publish eighteen months
after filing. See supra note 1 (discussing § 122(b)).
311. See Eames v. Andrews (The Driven-Well Cases), 122 U.S. 40, 56 (1887) (explaining
that an inventor’s ignorance of the scientific principles is immaterial as long as the patent’s
disclosure sets forth the “thing to be done ... so ... that it can be reproduced”); Radiator
Specialty Co. v. Buhot, 39 F.2d 373, 376 (3d Cir. 1930) (“It is with the inventive concept, the
thing achieved, not with the manner of its achievement or the quality of the mind which gave
it birth, that the patent law concerns itself.”); Earle v. Sawyer, 8 F. Cas. 254, 256 (C.C.D.
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a legitimization process known as peer review.312 Thus, the two
disseminate knowledge in related, though dissimilar, ways.
Yet the two spheres have much in common when it comes to the
role of disclosure in achieving certain ends. For example, in both
spheres there is hope that the disclosed information will actually
enrich the public storehouse of technical knowledge. This is why, at
a minimum, both patent law and science require a disclosure that
teaches something that is novel, nontrivial, and reproducible by
skilled artisans in the technical field.313 In the patent sphere, the
preceding discussion explained the null patent’s potential role in
gauging compliance with these requirements.314
But enriching the public storehouse of knowledge is only part of
the story of the disclosure function.315 Disclosure can help to achieve
two broader ends shared by patent law and science—namely, to
coordinate the future development of technology316 and to spur
innovation.317 Here too, the null patent can play a critical role.
Mass. 1825) (No. 4,247) (Story, J.) (“It is of no consequence, whether the thing be simple or
complicated; whether it be by accident, or by long, laborious thought ... that it is first done
[because the] law looks to the fact, and not to the process by which it is accomplished.”).
312. This process ensures that each research claim is reproducible, logical, independent,
and satisfies other basic conditions for communal acceptability. JOHN ZIMAN, REAL SCIENCE:
WHAT IT IS, AND WHAT IT MEANS 246 (2002). For a discussion of the mechanics of peer review,
see supra note 43.
313. Seymore, supra note 4, at 663. 
314. See supra Part III.A (discussing the role of failure in determining novelty, nonobvious-
ness, and enablement).
315. For additional perspectives, see Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV.
539, 548-52 (2009) (cataloguing the beneficial uses for disclosure in patent law); Timothy R.
Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 173-75 (2006) (describing the
“pervasive” role of disclosure in patent law and policy, including enriching the state of the art
contemporaneously with the invention and showing evidence of possession of the invention).
316. Julie S. Turner, The Nonmanufacturing Patent Owner: Toward a Theory of Efficient
Infringement, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 179, 194 (1998).
317. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989) (“[The]
effectiveness [of the patent system] in inducing creative effort and disclosure of the results of
that bargain, depend[s] almost entirely on a backdrop of free competition in the exploitation
of unpatented designs and innovations.”); see also Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S.
257, 262 (1979) (noting that one goal of patent law is “[to] promote[ ] disclosure of inventions
to stimulate further innovation”); Transco Prods. Inc. v. Performance Contracting, Inc., 38
F.3d 551, 558 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (rejecting an interpretation of § 112 that would “subvert the
patent system’s goal of ... encouraging early disclosure”); W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock,
Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“Early public disclosure is a linchpin of the patent
system.”). 
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Perhaps the most obvious way to coordinate the future develop-
ment of technology is to structure a disclosure regime that provides
researchers who might seek to work on a given problem with a
complete picture of the relevant accumulated knowledge. Knowing
the lay of the land promotes the efficient allocation of resources.318
The nondisclosure of negative results prevents this from happening
in at least two ways. First, other researchers might waste resources
on duplicative efforts, such as trying to develop something that
has already been attempted—albeit unsuccessfully—rather than
working on more productive activities.319 Second, ignorance of
failure might lead some researchers to avoid risky endeavors or
those with uncertain outcomes, and instead be “overly conservative,
perhaps even wasting societal resources on too-safe technology that
might be spent on other human endeavors or social needs.”320 In
both patent law and science, this waste impedes, rather than pro-
motes, technological progress.
That the dissemination of knowledge will promote innovative
activity is a firmly held goal shared by patent law and science.321
The null patent performs two functions that help achieve this end,
one that is obvious and the other that is more subtle. The obvious
function is to provide substantive technical knowledge from which
others can learn.322 Recall that failed experiments always yield
something—whether it be a serendipitous result, an abundance of
unexpected technical data, or simply knowledge that an initial
hypothesis was totally wrong.323 Regardless, there is hope that
someone can extract knowledge from failure and use it to achieve
success with the failed experiment or for other creative purposes.324
The more subtle function is to help the scientific community
develop a tolerance for failure. This is important because of the
318. Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247,
262-67 & n.79 (1994); Turner, supra note 316, at 194.
319. See F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of
Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55, 99-100 (2003) (describing how disclosure
can coordinate downstream activities, including the prevention of duplicative efforts); supra
notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
320. Henry Petroski, Review Essay, The Success of Failure, 42 TECH. & CULTURE 321, 328
(2001); see also discussion infra notes 325-30 and accompanying text.
321. See sources cited supra notes 309, 317.
322. See supra Part II.A.1.
323. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
324. FETZER, supra note 32, at 16-17.
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relationship between failure, uncertainty, and innovation.
Technological innovation involves uncertainty, including the risk of
failure.325 Uncertainty drives innovative activity because the
inability to sufficiently predict the outcome of a project provides the
motivation to dive in and figure it out.326 Put simply, “uncertainty
leads to choice, and choice favors mindfulness, which paves the way
for creativity.”327 But for this to happen, the scientist must have
developed a tolerance for failure.328 The ability to do so sets the most
creative innovators apart from ordinary scientists.329 It appears that
mainstream science is finally learning this lesson.330
325. See PAUL R. BEIJE, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN THE MODERN ECONOMY: BASIC TOPICS
AND NEW DEVELOPMENTS 97 (1998) (discussing technological uncertainty and innovation);
Göran Ekvall, Creative Climate, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CREATIVITY 403, 407 (Mark A. Runco
& Steven R. Pritzker eds., 1999) (“Innovation involves risk.”).
326. LEWIS M. BRANSCOMB & PHILIP E. AUERSWALD, TAKING TECHNICAL RISKS: HOW
INNOVATORS, EXECUTIVES, AND INVESTORS MANAGE HIGH-TECH RISKS 44-45 (2001); see also
GUY CLAXTON & BILL LUCAS, BE CREATIVE: ESSENTIAL STEPS TO REVITALIZE YOUR WORK AND
LIFE 24 (2004) (“[U]ncertainty requires ... creativ[ity], and creativity requires uncertainty.”). 
327. Becca Levy & Ellen Langer, Aging, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CREATIVITY, supra note 325,
at 45, 46. Of course, risk arises in other aspects of innovation. For example, consider a
pharmaceutical firm that invests staggering amounts of capital—typically hundreds of
millions of dollars—in developing a marketable product. The ability to obtain strong patent
protection is essential for the high-risk investment. FTC REPORT, supra note 276, ch. 3, at 1-6.
328. FETZER, supra note 32, at 16; see also ROBERT F. BRANDS WITH MARTIN J. KLEINMAN,
ROBERT’S RULES OF INNOVATION: A 10-STEP PROGRAM FOR CORPORATE SURVIVAL 23 (2010)
(“Not every idea can, or will, be a winner. Not every Eureka! moment pans out.... Champions
of ... innovation must have, and encourage, a tolerance for failure and enthusiasm for risk
taking.”). 
329. WAYNE M. BUNDY, INNOVATION, CREATIVITY, AND DISCOVERY IN MODERN
ORGANIZATIONS 220 (2002) (“Fear of failure is anathema to invention.”); see also RICHARD
FARSON & RALPH KEYES, THE INNOVATION PARADOX: THE SUCCESS OF FAILURE, THE FAILURE
OF SUCCESS 28-29 (2003) (describing how failure tolerance characterized many of America’s
prominent inventor-moguls, including Thomas Edison, Henry Ford, and the Wright Brothers);
FETZER, supra note 32, at 16.
330. For instance, both the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the National Science
Foundation (NSF) have set aside grant money for unconventional, high-risk research ideas
that can completely transform science. See NIH Director’s Transformative Research Award
Program, THE NIH COMMON FUND, http://commonfund.nih.gov/TRA (last visited Mar. 28,
2012) (noting that the TR01 program was “created specifically to support exceptionally
innovative and/or unconventional research projects that have the potential to create or
overturn fundamental paradigms”); NAT’L SCI. FOUND., GRANT PROPOSAL GUIDE II-20 (2009),
available at http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/policydocs/pappguide/nsf10_1/gpgprint.pdf (explaining
that the Early Concept Grants for Exploratory Research funding mechanism may be used to
support potentially transformative research that is “especially ‘high risk-high payoff’”); Amy
Maxmen, Taking Risks To Transform Science, 139 CELL 13, 13-15 (2009) (exploring the
aforementioned programs and similar initiatives).
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C. Potential Objections and Implementation Concerns
1. Technical Junk and Nuisance Prior Art
Harvesting negative results from the sea of squandered knowl-
edge will increase the amount of technical information in the public
domain and, consequently, also expand the universe of potentially
patent-defeating prior art. This expansion might raise a concern
about so-called “nuisance” prior art.331 Though often defined as
information of dubious value or technical merit (“technical junk”)332
intentionally disclosed by a third party “to muddy the waters in a
defensive or nuisance maneuver,”333 nuisance prior art also includes
innocuously disclosed information that has the same effect.334 
Fortunately, null patents would not be a source of nuisance prior
art for two related reasons. First, given that the information
disclosed in a null patent would emanate from actual experimenta-
tion,335 it would have intrinsic technical merit. A scientist can
always extract something from a failed experiment.336 On the other
hand, nuisance prior art discloses work not actually performed or
things not physically made.337 The classic example is the disclosure
of the structure of a hypothetical chemical compound with no details
about how to make it.338 In contrast to actual experimental results,
331. David S. Wainwright, Patenting Around Nuisance Prior Art, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 221, 221 (1999).
332. Id. at 222, 223 n.3.
333. Id. at 221-22. 
334. Nuisance prior art describing an unworkable invention “can also be generated as a
result of a bona fide attempt at a constructive reduction to practice that for some unexpected
reason fails to work as disclosed.” Id. at 223-24; see also supra note 268 (defining constructive
reduction to practice). But, in a bona fide disclosure, “it is usually easy to determine that
which is known and that which is supposition and there is no attempt therein to mislead or
omit relevant information.” Wainwright, supra note 331, at 224.
335. See supra Part II.B.2.
336. See supra note 323 and accompanying text.
337. Wainwright, supra note 331, at 223-26 (explaining how to recognize nuisance prior
art).
338. See Andrew Chin, Artful Prior Art and the Quality of DNA Patents, 57 ALA. L. REV.
975, 1000 (2006) (exploring novelty issues that can arise when the asserted prior art reference
discloses a voluminous list of compounds). To be sure, “[s]avvy third-party patentees ... have
an incentive to purposely create [patentability] hurdles for subsequent inventors by
strategically disclosing unclaimed, unmade compounds in their patents.” Seymore, supra note
182, at 944. This is an excellent example of defensive publication. Id. at 945-46; supra Part
II.B.5.
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the disclosure of hypothetical subject matter has dubious technical
merit and is more likely to be technical junk.339 
The second reason why null patents would not be a source of
nuisance prior art is because they are not true patents. Recall that
a presumption of enablement attaches to all of the subject matter
disclosed in a patent when it is asserted as prior art.340 Critically,
during the prosecution341 of the prior art patent, the examiner
evaluates only the claimed subject matter disclosed in the applica-
tion; the key corollary being that the unclaimed subject matter is
not examined for compliance with the enablement requirement.342
For obvious reasons, it is this unexamined, unclaimed information
that is likely to be technical junk.343 But regardless, when the patent
issued, all of the technical information disclosed therein—both
claimed and unclaimed—morphed into presumptively enabled,
patent-defeating prior art.344 If this patent is later asserted as prior
art, the subsequent applicant’s inability or unwillingness to rebut
339. Seymore, supra note 4, at 631-32 (explaining that particularly in the experimental
sciences, there is a real danger that fictitious examples cannot be made and are generally of
little use to other researchers); cf. Wainwright, supra note 331, at 224 (explaining that
documents that “suggest broad unsupported concepts or wishes” and lack adequate disclosure
do not teach the PHOSITA how to make or reproduce the subject matter without undue
experimentation).
340. See supra note 196 and accompanying text. In Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel,
Inc., the Federal Circuit held that the underlying presumption of enablement encompasses
both claimed and unclaimed subject matter in a prior art patent. 314 F.3d 1313, 1355 (Fed.
Cir. 2003). As support for its holding, the court explained that the examiner should not bear
the burden of analyzing enablement each time an allegedly anticipating third-party patent
is challenged. Id. at 1355 & n.21.
341. Patent prosecution describes the process by which an inventor, usually through the
help of an attorney, files an application with the PTO for examination. See MIELE, supra note
295, at 96-97 (describing the patent prosecution process).
342. MPEP, supra note 116, § 2164.08 (“All questions of enablement are evaluated against
the claimed subject matter.”); see also Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 946 F.2d 1528,
1531 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“Unclaimed subject matter is not subject to the disclosure requirements
of § 112; the reasons are pragmatic: the disclosure would be boundless, and the pitfalls
endless.”). Creating patentability hurdles for subsequent applicants is one reason why
patentees disclose information but do not claim it. For other reasons, see Seymore, supra note
182, at 944 n.124. Ultimately, disclosed-but-unclaimed subject matter is dedicated to the
public. Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en
banc).
343. See Seymore, supra note 182, at 944-45 (criticizing the presumption of enablement for
prior art patentees, particularly as it relates to unexamined subject matter); supra note 339
and accompanying text.
344. See supra note 340.
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the presumption of enablement, or otherwise overcome the prior art,
will defeat patentability.345 So now it becomes clear why some
unscrupulous third parties intentionally fill their patents with
unclaimed technical junk for nuisance purposes.346 But because the
presumption of enablement is presently limited to issued patents,
null patents and other forms of nonpatent literature are unlikely
sources of nuisance prior art.347
2. Administrative Burden
The null patent regime proposed herein would admittedly impose
on the PTO additional layers of cost and recordkeeping. It would
add an extra administrative burden to an agency that is already
strained for resources.348 This proposal certainly cuts against the
grain because most other patent reform proposals seek to reduce the
burden on the PTO.349
345. See Seymore, supra note 182, at 944 (explaining the difficulties in proving that a
nuisance prior art reference is nonenabling); Wainwright, supra note 331, at 222
(“[U]nfortunately many learned applicants may abandon protection of their work when faced
with nuisance prior art, even when they perceive a nuisance prior art item as being technical
junk.”).
346. Wainwright, supra note 331, at 223. Thus, creating nuisance prior art is a form of
defensive publication. For example:
[A third-party patentee] could ... generate millions upon millions of plausible
chemical structures and load them into multiple patent applications together
with one compound that actually meets all of the patentability [requirements]
in each patent application. The applicant could then claim that enabled
compound and get a patent issued on that compound and have the rest of the
[disclosed but unclaimed] structures become enabled prior art.
CHRIS P. MILLER & MARK J. EVANS, THE CHEMIST’S COMPANION GUIDE TO PATENT LAW 170 n.4
(2010); see also supra note 170 (discussing strategic disclosure as a “spoiler” tactic).
347. The Federal Circuit has not decided whether nonpatent references are entitled to a
presumption of enablement. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1355
n.22 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“We note that by logical extension, our reasoning here might also apply
to [nonpatent] prior art printed publications as well, but as Sugimoto is a patent we need not
and do not so decide today.”).
348. See COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECON., NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 81-83 (Stephen A. Merrill et
al. eds., 2004) (describing the additional resources that the PTO will need to improve its
performance); Ed O’Keefe, New Boss Moves Quickly to Change Sluggish Patent Office, WASH.
POST, Oct. 20, 2009, at A17 (noting that the PTO’s revenue stream limits modernization
efforts and contributes to the agency’s sluggish performance); supra notes 298-302 and
accompanying text.
349. See, e.g., Beth Simone Noveck, “Peer to Patent”: Collective Intelligence, Open Review,
2104 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:2041
This increased burden is certainly a legitimate concern, but one
to which there are several responses. First, recall that the purpose
of the null patent is not only to serve as a medium for disclosing and
disseminating negative results, but also to put that information into
the examiner’s hands for assessing patentability.350 Although there
might be other ways to achieve the former, housing the null patent
database at the PTO is the only way to ensure the latter. This is
true not only because examiners are more likely to assert references
found in patent databases than from other information sources,351
but also because examiners give more weight to information found
in the PTO’s own databases.352 Put simply, hosting the database at
the PTO would increase the chances that an examiner would search
it and find the relevant technical information.353
Second, the PTO has experience generating patent-like docu-
ments and including them in databases. Aside from patents, the
PTO produces published patent applications and SIRs that are
classified, indexed, and cross-referenced.354 Developing and main-
taining the null patent database would not be an unfamiliar task. 
Third, any burden required for the PTO to administer the null
patent regime would be slight in comparison to the benefits that
would flow from it. Perhaps the most obvious benefit is improved
patent quality. Critics argue that a major contributor to the quality
problem is that examiners lack adequate technical information to
conduct a rigorous examination, particularly when that information
comes from nonpatent sources.355 The null patent goes a long way
toward solving this problem. And to the extent that null patents
would lead to a more robust examination, that would provide a
and Patent Reform, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123, 143-51 (2006) (proposing an examination
paradigm in which “those with the necessary know-how” can participate by submitting and
commenting on prior art, thereby reducing the examiner’s burden).
350. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 20, 112 and accompanying text.
352. See Gleick, supra note 111, at 47; Sampat, supra note 20, at 3; sources cited supra note
113.
353. See supra note 113.
354. For a description of the indexing and classification of patent documents, see supra
note 98. SIRs are discussed supra notes 115-20 and accompanying text. 
355. See supra notes 283-89 and accompanying text.
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disincentive for those with low-quality inventions to file,356 thereby
reducing the burden on PTO resources. 
The technical information disclosed through the null patent
regime would not only expand the universe of prior art,357 which is
of prime importance to the PTO, but would also enrich the public
storehouse of technical knowledge and promote its dissemination.358
In both patent law and science, there is hope that a richer body of
knowledge will both coordinate the future development of technol-
ogy and spur innovative activity.359 The point here is that by admin-
istering the database, the PTO itself—as opposed to inventors,
Congress, and the courts—could play an active role in promoting
broader goals of patent law and science.360 
CONCLUSION
Negative results fill the sea of squandered knowledge. Negative
is an unfortunate term because, although experiments often fail to
work as planned, these failures always produce valuable technical
information—whether it be a serendipitous finding, an abundance
of unexpected technical data, or simply knowledge that an initial
hypothesis was totally wrong. Though some have recognized that
the dissemination of negative results has many upsides for science,
transforming scientific norms toward disclosure is no easy task. As
for patent law, the potentially important role that negative results
can play in determining patentability has heretofore been over-
looked. The null patent regime advanced in this Article attempts to
address these issues. And, perhaps even more importantly, its
implementation would promote broader policy goals shared by both
science and patent law—namely, to promote technological progress
through the dissemination of knowledge, to coordinate the future
development of technology, and to spur innovation.
356. Cf. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 14, at 175 (“To put it crudely, if the [PTO] allows bad
patents to issue, this encourages people with bad applications to show up.”).
357. See supra Part III.A.1-2.
358. See supra Part III.B.2.
359. See supra Part III.B.2.
360. Cf. supra note 114 and accompanying text.
